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The recent decisions in Missouri v. Frye and Lafler v. Cooper represent a seismic shift in the 
Court’s right to counsel jurisprudence.  No longer is the right to counsel limited to protecting the 
fairness and adequacy of the trial.  Although these two cases arose in the plea bargaining context, 
the doctrinal shift may have its greatest impact in cases where plea bargaining is not at issue.  
This Article identifies the salient features of this new—non-trial oriented—conception of the right 
to counsel and explains its far-reaching impacts on the day-to-day practice of criminal law.  
Specifically, this Article explains the import of the newly minted right to effective assistance as it 
relates to a variety of procedural constitutional rights, including speedy trial, pretrial detention, 
double jeopardy, and jury selection rights.   The explicit recognition that the right to counsel is not 
only, or even primarily a trial or truth protecting right promises to be a staggeringly important 
constitutional event. 
INTRODUCTION 
No longer is the right to counsel limited to protecting the fairness 
and adequacy of the trial itself.  With the Court’s decisions in Missouri 
v. Frye1 and Lafler v. Cooper,2 a new era in the jurisprudence of the 
Sixth Amendment has begun.  This Article identifies the salient fea-
tures of this new—non-trial oriented—conception of the right to 
counsel and explains its far-reaching impacts on the day to day prac-
tice of criminal law.  Frye and Lafler represent the two most significant 
ineffective assistance of counsel cases since the right was first recog-
nized in Strickland v. Washington.3
 
 * I am grateful to Rebecca Aviel, Alan Chen, and Ian Farrell for their insightful comments 
and assistance with this project.  I am also indebted to Hermine Kallman, Neal McCono-
my, and Gabriel Olivares for their research assistance.  I would also like to thank the ex-
ceptional team of editors that worked on this Article.  At the time of writing this article, 
certiorari had not yet been granted in Lafler and Frye.  Only because of the patience and 
flexibility of this journal was I able to adapt the Article to reflect the import of these deci-
sions on my thesis. 
  In view of the fact that ineffective 
 1 No. 10-444, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
 2 No. 10-209, slip op. (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
 3 466 U.S. 668 (1984).  See Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the two cases as opening “a whole new field of constitu-
tionalized criminal procedure”); see Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Mar. 
21, 2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that the holding is certainly “a new rule of law” 
for purposes of constitutional retroactivity); see also Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 
5 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing the cases as “inconsistent with 
the Sixth Amendment and decades of our precedent”).  In describing these decisions as 
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assistance of counsel is “by far the most common basis for relief 
sought in habeas petitions,”4
The underlying question in Frye and Lafler was whether the right 
to counsel would adapt to reflect the reality of modern criminal prac-
tice, or whether the Sixth Amendment would serve only to protect 
against unfair trials.
 a significant shift in the Strickland doc-
trine promises to have immediate and far-reaching implications. 
5  That is to say, given that criminal litigation is 
increasingly front-loaded such that the trial is no longer the main 
event,6
 
representing a major development in the Sixth Amendment law, I am mindful of the fact 
that most defendants will not obtain relief for errors of counsel at the plea bargaining 
stage.  Nonetheless, the value of these decisions in reframing the scope of the right away 
from trial and guilt and in the direction of general fairness promises to be significant. 
 Moreover, the symbolic and norm-shaping impact of this sort of decision cannot be un-
derstated.  Cf. John G. Douglass, Can Prosecutors Bluff? Brady v. Maryland and Plea Bargain-
ing, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 581, 589–90 (2007) (“Despite the Court's narrow definition 
of materiality, Brady's symbolic power in the pretrial context remains stronger prosecutors 
want to avoid Brady problems altogether.  Indeed, Brady's greatest value may be symbol-
ic.”). 
 the question was whether the right to effective assistance 
would extend so as to ensure competent representation even when 
the reliability or fairness of the trial itself was not at issue.  The Frye 
and Lafler decisions were decided on the same day, both were 5-4 
votes, both were authored by Justice Kennedy, and both unequivocal-
 4 Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, Dreaming of Effective Assistance:  The Awakening of Cronic’s 
Call to Presume Prejudice from Representational Absence, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 827, 832 (2003) (cit-
ing U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 
REVIEW CHALLENGING STATE COURT CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS 14 (1995)). 
 5 The right to counsel is generally regarded as a gateway right.  The commentary and case 
law on this point is too vast to fairly survey, but a few notable examples illustrate the 
point.  See, e.g., Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985) (explaining that the right to 
counsel “cannot be limited to participation in a trial” because deprivations of this right 
during “the period prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel during 
the trial itself”); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 309 (1973) (recognizing the right to 
counsel as fundamentally minimizing the “imbalance in the adversary system”); United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (celebrating the right to counsel for ensuring 
the defendant “need not stand alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, 
formal or informal”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (emphasizing that 
the right to counsel is a necessity, not a luxury); see also Stephen B. Bright, Turning Cele-
brated Principles into Reality, CHAMPION, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 6 (noting that it is common-
place for “leaders of the judiciary, legal profession and government [to] give speeches” 
emphasizing and glorifying the ideal of the right to counsel); James J. Tomkovicz, An Ad-
versary System Defense of the Right to Counsel Against Informants:  Truth, Fair Play, and the Mas-
siah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 40 (1988) (“Counsel is the central component of 
the system, the glue that holds it together, and the protector of other guarantees.”). 
 6 Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) (“The reality is that plea 
bargains have become so central to the administration of the criminal justice system” it is 
no longer accurate to describe pretrial proceedings such as plea bargaining as an “ad-
junct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice system.” (internal citation 
omitted)). 
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ly rejected, trial-centered conception of the right to counsel.7  By un-
equivocally rejecting a cramped, formulistic view of the right to coun-
sel that is oriented exclusively towards protecting the innocent and 
the integrity of the trial, these decisions reflect a seismic shift in Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence.8
The purpose of this Article is to analyze the breadth and signific-
ance of the Court’s rejection of the conclusion that “the sole purpose 
of the Sixth Amendment is to protect the right to a fair trial.”
 
9
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part One provides an overview 
of the right to counsel, particularly as the right has developed with 
regard to the protection of pretrial rights.  Part Two examines the di-
chotomous readings of Strickland that existed in the literature and 
published decisions and that were competing for legitimacy during 
the decades preceding this Term’s decisions in Frye and Lafler.  In 
Part Three, the reasoning behind the Frye and Lafler cases is dis-
cussed, and the role of these decisions in markedly expanding the 
scope of the Strickland rule is emphasized.  Finally, in Part Four, the 
practical implications of the new era of effective assistance are dis-
cussed.  Specifically, Part Four analyzes an array of procedural 
rights—jury selection, speedy trial, pretrial detention—and demon-
strates that the Court’s decision to definitively sever the right to 
  Specif-
ically, this Article explains the import of the newly-minted right to ef-
fective assistance as it relates to a variety of pretrial constitutional 
rights.  In other words, this Article creates a road map for under-
standing the new era of right to counsel claims by cataloguing the 
numerous issues of procedural litigation which for years have divided 
lower courts and appeared unanswerable. 
 
 7 Both Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye involve plea bargains, a topic not directly taken 
up by this paper.  Prior to these decisions, other commentators had thoroughly canvassed 
this discrete topic.  See, e.g., David A. Perez, Note, Deal or No Deal?  Remedying Ineffective As-
sistance of Counsel During Plea Bargaining, 120 YALE L.J. 1532, 1539 (2011) (explaining that 
plea bargaining is a “critical stage of the prosecution after adversarial proceedings have 
begun” to which the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel attaches); Paul J. Sampson, 
Note, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Plea Bargain Negotiations, 2010 BYU L. REV. 251, 253, 
266 (arguing that the Sixth Amendment ensures a fair trial, not effective plea bargain-
ing); Leigh Tinmouth, Note, The Fairness of a Fair Trial:  Not Guilty Pleas and the Right to Ef-
fective Assistance of Counsel, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1607, 1635 (2009) (discussing the right to effec-
tive assistance of counsel for not guilty pleas). 
 8 Just last Term, the Court strongly suggested that non-trial based claims of ineffective assis-
tance of counsel are of a lower tier, and less likely to warrant relief.  Premo v. Moore, 131 
S. Ct. 733, 742 (2011) (concluding that the absence of a record in pretrial, plea negotia-
tions justifies a heightened deference to counsel in the pretrial context). 
 9 Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 6 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
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counsel from concerns about the reliability of a guilty verdict is a 
staggeringly important constitutional event. 
I. OVERVIEW OF THE PRETRIAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
At common law a defendant charged with a felony was not en-
titled to the assistance of counsel, even if he was willing and able to 
retain and pay for an attorney.10  A defendant facing felony charges 
was, with a few narrow exceptions, prohibited from obtaining the as-
sistance of counsel.11  The Sixth Amendment expressly rejected the 
harshness of this common law approach and recognized, in relevant 
part, that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.”12  The 
right to counsel granted to defendants by the Sixth Amendment was, 
therefore, first and foremost, a rejection of the common law practice 
of prohibiting representation in felonies.  In this way, the Sixth 
Amendment, as initially conceived, was effectively a negative liberty.13
However, as Professor Pamela Metzger has explained, the “mod-
ern Sixth Amendment counsel guarantee is, and should be, a radical-
ly different guarantee than that contemplated by the Framers.”
 
14  Pro-
fessor Metzger has made a compelling case for understanding the 
history of the right to counsel as a history dominated by doctrinal de-
velopment such that the right was constantly changing to respond to 
the current “realities of criminal procedure.”15
 
10  As one scholar has noted, “[t]he right to counsel does not have the illustrious Anglo-
American heritage one might expect.”  Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 10. 
  Among the most im-
portant adaptations of the right to counsel was the shift to an under-
standing of the Sixth Amendment as bestowing affirmative rights ra-
11  Defendants were entitled to counsel if they were charged under the Treason Act of 1695.  
See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 824 & n.24 (1975) (citing the express language of 
the English statute providing for the assistance of counsel). 
12  U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  Notably, the right to counsel, even as a negative liberty, did not 
extend to persons charged with state crimes; “states made their own decisions about 
access to counsel” insofar as the Sixth Amendment did not apply to the states.  Pamela R. 
Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line:  A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 
1635, 1641 (2003). 
13  See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60–66 (1932) (summarizing the common law rule 
barring persons accused of felonies from obtaining counsel and examining the Sixth 
Amendment response to this rule); see also Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1495 
(2010) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Sixth Amendment as originally understood and rati-
fied meant only that a defendant had a right to employ counsel, or to use volunteered 
services . . . .”). 
14  Metzger, supra note 12, at 1637. 
15  Id. 
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ther than purely negative liberties.16  The right to counsel as currently 
conceived requires that the court affirmatively appoint counsel for all 
indigent persons facing felony charges unless the defendant knowing-
ly and voluntarily waives the right to representation.17
Notably, the affirmative right to counsel “cannot be satisfied by 
mere appointment.”
 
18  Because the right to counsel serves as the 
“glue that holds” the system of justice together,19
 
 16 At this point the affirmative right to counsel is largely beyond controversy.  See Abe Krash, 
Remarks at the Conference on the 30th Anniversary of the United States Supreme 
Court’s Decision in Gideon v. Wainwright:  Gideon and the Public Service Role of Lawyers 
in Advancing Equal Justice (Mar. 18, 1993), in 43 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 27 (1993) (“[C]ritics 
have urged the Supreme Court to limit or to overrule various decisions of the 1950s and 
the 1960s with respect to the rights of accused persons, but no responsible voice—no re-
sponsible voice—is heard today urging that the Gideon decision should be overruled.”).  
Even leading textualist-originalists like Akhil Amar have summarized the affirmative right 
to counsel as follows:  “The text of the counsel clause can be read either way.  But struc-
tural arguments strongly support the modern Court’s view that indigent defendants have 
a right to the assistance of counsel at government expense.”  AKHIL REED AMAR, THE 
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  FIRST PRINCIPLES 140 (1997). 
 the right to the ap-
pointment of a lawyer would be rendered largely symbolic and hollow 
unless the right to counsel includes the right to the effective assis-
tance of counsel.  Stated another way, if the right to counsel is de-
signed to aid the adversarial system in producing “just results,” then a 
logical corollary of the right to appointment of counsel is the right to 
effective assistance from counsel; the former right does not serve its 
 17 See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963) (“The right of one charged with 
crime to counsel may not be deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some 
countries, but it is in ours.”); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 463–64 (1938) (“The Sixth 
Amendment withholds from federal courts, in all criminal proceedings, the power and 
authority to deprive an accused of his life or liberty unless he has or waives the assistance 
of counsel. . . . A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a 
known right or privilege.”).  Even a defendant facing only misdemeanor charges is en-
titled to the appointment of counsel if he is sentenced to actual incarceration.  Argersin-
ger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972).  Moreover, a defendant wishing to waive his right 
to counsel faces a number of hurdles.  See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) 
(noting the loss of “traditional benefits associated with the right to counsel” and “the 
dangers and disadvantages of self-representation”); 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 11.5(d) (3d ed. 2011) (noting that “[t]he defendant in Faretta made a clear 
and unequivocal request to proceed pro se, and courts insist upon such a request as a 
prerequisite for the exercise of the right of self-representation” and explaining that there 
is even a heightened standard of competence for persons who wish to proceed without 
counsel at trial). 
 18 Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 377 (1986) (citing Avery v. Alabama, 308 U.S. 444, 
446 (1940), as cited by Walter V. Schaefer, Federalism and State Criminal Procedure, 70 HARV. 
L. REV. 1, 8 (1956), for the proposition that the right to counsel is the keystone right for 
all of criminal procedure); see also United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 655 (1984) (cit-
ing Avery, 308 U.S. at 446) (concluding that “mere formal appointment” does not satisfy 
the text of the Sixth Amendment, which requires “assistance” of counsel). 
 19 Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 40. 
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purpose without the latter right.  Consistent with this view, in Strick-
land v. Washington, the Court held that the right to appointed counsel 
naturally and necessarily implies a right to adequate and effective re-
presentation.20  Strickland quelled lower court confusions as to the 
proper standard for evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
by creating a two-part test that requires a defendant to show that 
counsel’s performance was deficient—based on an “objective stan-
dard of reasonableness”—and that he was prejudiced by the errors of 
counsel.21
The existence of a right to effective representation in general, 
however, does not meaningfully illuminate the scope of pretrial effec-
tive assistance rights.  It is clear that the right to effective assistance, 
in its most robust articulation, cannot apply more broadly than the 
right to counsel simpliciter—that is to say, where there is no right to 
appointed counsel, a fortiori there is no right to effective assistance of 
counsel.
 
22
The threshold question of attachment is understood as enforcing 
the textual requirement that the Sixth Amendment only applies to 
“criminal prosecutions,” and thus the question of when the right at-
taches is an inquiry about when a criminal prosecution begins.  Re-
cently, the Supreme Court addressed the attachment issue and ex-
plained that a defendant’s “initial appearance before a judicial 
officer, where he learns the charge against him and his liberty is sub-
  The right to appointed counsel is triggered only where two 
technical requirements are satisfied:  (1) the right to counsel must 
have attached; and (2) the proceeding in question must be at a critical 
stage. 
 
 20 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685 (1984).  The Court has explained that the 
“right to counsel is the right to effective assistance of counsel.”  Id. at 686; Kimmelman, 477 
U.S. at 377 (internal citations omitted). 
 21 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 692–93.  Prior to Strickland, “the Supreme Court did not offer 
guidance about ineffective assistance claims” and what was required was “anybody’s 
guess.”  Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel:  The Case for an Ex Ante Parity 
Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 242, 272 (1997). 
 22 See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 755–57 (1991) (holding that defendant 
had no constitutional right to counsel in a state post-conviction proceeding and, thus, 
could not claim ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceeding); Ross v. Moffit, 417 
U.S. 600 (1974) (holding that defendant had no constitutional right to counsel in his dis-
cretionary appeal to the State Supreme Court); Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for A Constitu-
tional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 572 (2009) (“[T]he Su-
preme Court has rejected any claim of ineffective assistance of counsel . . . on the ground 
that there can be no constitutionally ineffective counsel absent a right to counsel in the 
first instance.”).  Recently, the Court has recognized that ineffective assistance of counsel 
during an “initial-review collateral proceeding” may serve as cause to excuse a procedural 
default, but the Court stopped short of recognizing a freestanding constitutional right to 
effective assistance.  Martinez v. Ryan, No. 10-1001, slip op. at 5 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2012). 
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ject to restriction, marks the start of adversary judicial proceedings that 
trigger attachment of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.”23  The 
Sixth Amendment, then, does not apply merely because the police 
are investigating someone, or because they have sought or obtained a 
warrant, or even when they make an arrest.24  Instead, the Sixth 
Amendment is limited by its own terms so as not to apply “until a 
prosecution is commenced,”25 and the point of commencement has 
been recognized as a defendant’s initial appearance.26
The Court’s clarity in Rothgery as to when the right to counsel at-
taches ended three decades of confusion on this issue.  Scholars and 
courts had spent considerable ink attempting to define the point at 
which a defendant faces sufficiently “formal charges” so as to indicate 
the beginning of a “criminal prosecution,” and, thus, the attachment 
of the right to counsel.
 
27
 
 23 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) (emphasis added); Id. at 214 (Alito, 
J., concurring) (agreeing with the Court’s analysis and elaborating that the right to coun-
sel can be divided into three questions—when does it apply (criminal prosecutions); who is 
entitled to the right (the “accused”); and what does the right guarantee (assistance of 
counsel for one’s defense)).  In contrast, Justice Clarence Thomas explained that, based 
on his understanding of the original meaning of the phrase “in all criminal prosecu-
tions,” the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not apply until there are formal 
charges, which requires an indictment in most federal cases.  Id. at 218–25 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). 
  But resolving the attachment issue is only 
 24 Id. at 198 (describing for constitutional purposes when the right to counsel attaches); see 
also id. (noting that the attachment of the right to counsel and the “state obligation to 
appoint counsel” are not necessarily coextensive insofar as the right might apply or attach 
even before the state has an absolute obligation to provide counsel); id. at 211 (distin-
guishing between “the attachment question (whether formal judicial proceedings have 
begun) and the distinct ‘critical stage’ question (whether counsel must be present at a 
postattachment proceeding unless the right to assistance is validly waived)”). 
 25 McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 175 (1991).  Paradoxically, the Supreme Court has 
held that for purposes of the Sixth Amendment speedy trial right, the criminal prosecu-
tion begins with the arrest, or the indictment, whichever comes first.   U.S. v. Marion, 404 
U.S. 307, 320 (1971) ("it is either a formal indictment or information or else the actual 
restraints imposed by arrest and holding to answer a criminal charge that engage the par-
ticular protections of the speedy trial provision of the Sixth Amendment."). 
 26 Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213 (Alito, J., concurring).  In Rothgery, the Court emphasized that 
the attachment of the right to counsel is not contingent on the title a jurisdiction pre-
scribes to a defendant’s first appearance in court.  Id. at 207–08 (regarding the issue as 
one of “federal law” that is unaffected by the terminology used by a particular jurisdic-
tion, and treating a Texas Article 15.17 Hearing as an initial appearance for purposes of 
federal law); see also The Supreme Court, 2007 Term—Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 
311 (2008) (celebrating the clarity of Rothgery by noting:  “The Court defined [] attach-
ment . . . in neutral terms, avoiding jargon like ‘arraignment’ and ‘preliminary hearing’ 
that have different definitions in different jurisdictions.”). 
 27 See, e.g., Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 431 (1986) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel does not attach until after the initiation of formal charges.”); Kirby v. Illinois, 406 
U.S. 682, 689 (1972) (recognizing that the right to counsel is triggered by “the initiation 
of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary 
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half the battle.28  Even when the right to counsel has formally at-
tached, there is no right to the appointment of counsel unless the 
proceedings in question are deemed sufficiently critical to the crimi-
nal proceeding.29  That is to say, the appointment and presence of 
counsel are not required unless, post-attachment, the defendant is 
involved in a critical stage of the criminal litigation process.  Rothgery 
emphasized that the mere attachment of the right to counsel does 
not, standing alone, require appointment of counsel; the opinion 
warned lower courts to “avoid[] the mistake of merging the attach-
ment question (whether formal judicial proceedings have begun) 
with the distinct ‘critical stage’ question (whether counsel must be 
present . . .).”30  The determination of the constitutional scope of a 
right to appointed counsel rests, therefore, on the assessment of 
what, other than the trial itself, constitutes a sufficiently critical stage 
to trigger the Sixth Amendment.31
 
hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment”).  A leading casebook notes, “[i]t is 
not clear what the Supreme Court means by ‘formal charge.”  STEPHEN A. SALTZBERG & 
DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  CASES AND COMMENTARY 846 (9th ed. 
2010). 
 
 28 The attachment of the right to counsel, then, is a somewhat symbolic and meaningless 
concept.  Attachment appears to merely trigger the limitations on police announced in 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205–06 (1964), and in this sense functions as a 
prophylactic negative liberty, as opposed to the affirmative right to counsel promised by 
the right to counsel. 
 29 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 223–27 (1967), signals the beginning of the Court’s 
willingness to recognize the need for the right to counsel to extend affirmative protec-
tions beyond the trial itself.  Id. at 224 (explaining that at the time of ratification “there 
were no organized police forces” and that the changing nature of the criminal prosecu-
tion required a similarly evolving notion of the protections enshrined by the right to 
counsel).  Wade also provides a working definition of the critical stage concept.  Id. at 227 
(defining critical stage as a point when assistance of counsel is necessary “to help 
avoid . . . [potential substantial prejudice to defendant’s rights]”); see also id. at 226 (“[I]n 
addition to counsel’s presence at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand 
alone against the State at any stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or 
out, where counsel’s absence might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 30 Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 211.  Justice Alito wrote a separate concurrence in Rothgery primarily 
to explain that he did “not understand [the Court] to hold that” there is a right to ap-
pointed counsel merely because the right has attached.  Id. at 213 (Alito, J., concurring). 
 31 Critical stages are those points during the criminal process, both in and out of court, 
where the presence of counsel is necessary to help the accused “in coping with legal prob-
lems or . . . meeting his adversary.”  Id. at 212 n.16 (citing United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 
300, 313 (1973)).  The Court’s definitive exposition of the Sixth Amendment’s phrase 
“criminal prosecutions” was provided in Kirby v. Illinois, where the Court explained that a 
criminal prosecution is said to exist whenever judicial proceedings have been initiated 
“whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or ar-
raignment.” 406 U.S. 682, 689–90 (1972).  At times the Court has suggested that certain 
pretrial events were more critical to a defendant’s ability to receive effective assistance of 
counsel than the trial itself.  See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 205 (1964) 
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The Court has repeatedly and consistently recognized that certain 
pretrial events constitute critical stages that trigger the attachment 
and the requirement of appointment of counsel.  Although the trial 
may be the most dramatic and exciting part of the criminal process, 
deprivations of the right to counsel “during the period prior to trial 
may be more damaging than denial of counsel during the trial it-
self.”32  There is explicit recognition throughout the Court’s Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence that pretrial proceedings oftentimes “set-
tle the accused’s fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.”33  
The A.B.A. Standards for Criminal Justice are in accord, elaborating 
that “[e]ffective representation consists of much more than the advo-
cate’s courtroom function per se.”34  It is well established, for exam-
ple, that certain pretrial confrontations between the police and the 
defendant, such as when the police interrogate or attempt to elicit 
incriminating statements from the defendant post-attachment, impli-
cate the assistance of counsel rights under the Sixth Amendment.35  
In short, it has long been clear that the right to appointed counsel is 
not merely coterminous with the right to the assistance of counsel at 
trial.36
In the wake of Rothgery, it is clear that “[o]nce attachment occurs, 
the accused at least is entitled to the presence of appointed counsel 
 
 
(describing the period between arraignment until trial as “perhaps the most critical pe-
riod of the proceedings” (internal citations omitted)). 
 32 Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); see also Kirby, 406 U.S. at 688 n.6 (confirming 
that it is not the case that a defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to 
counsel only at the trial itself). 
 33 Wade, 388 U.S. at 224. 
 34 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE:  PROSECUTION 
FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNCTION § 4–4.1 (3d ed. 1993); see also Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 212 
(“Once attachment occurs, the accused at least is entitled to the presence of appointed 
counsel during any ‘critical stage’ of the postattachment proceedings . . . .” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 35 Scholars have pointed out that the Court has failed to adequately “explain the Sixth 
Amendment premises that justify a pretrial right to counsel . . . .”  James J. Tomkovicz, 
Reaffirming the Right to Pretrial Assistance:  The Surprising Little Case of Fellers v. United 
States, 15 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 501, 516 (2006). 
 36 In Rothgery, the Court was confronted with a narrow issue.  The lower federal courts had 
granted summary judgment against a civil plaintiff on the theory that his right to counsel 
had not attached at the initial hearing.  554 U.S. at 198.  The Supreme Court reversed 
and held that an initial appearance did trigger the right to counsel, but explained that it 
was not deciding whether a “6-month delay in appointment of counsel” following an ini-
tial appearance “resulted in prejudice to Rothgery’s Sixth Amendment rights.”  Id. at 213; 
id. (Alito, J., concurring) (“I join the Court’s opinion because I do not understand it to 
hold that a defendant is entitled to the assistance of appointed counsel as soon as his 
Sixth Amendment right attaches.”). 
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during any ‘critical stage’ of the post-attachment proceedings.”37  
However, the recognition that a defendant is entitled to the ap-
pointment of counsel at or shortly after the initial appearance is little 
more than a useless platitude if the pretrial litigation of non-trial 
rights is not considered a critical stage.38
II. THE FAIRNESS DICHOTOMY—RELIABILITY OF THE VERDICT OR 
THE FAIRNESS OF THE PROCEDURES? 
  The right to appointed 
counsel divorced from a right to effective assistance of counsel is a 
hollow right.  And yet, surprisingly, prior to Frye and Lafler, very few 
definitive statements of law regarding the scope of the right to pretri-
al effective assistance existed in the opinions of courts or the scholar-
ly commentary.  That is to say, the Strickland right’s application to the 
pretrial context has long suffered from uncertainty. 
Clarity as to the scope of the Strickland right’s application has long 
been marred by divergent understandings of the nature and purpose 
of the right.  On the one hand, Strickland, particularly through its pre-
judice requirement, can be understood to preclude claims of pretrial 
ineffective assistance of counsel when the reliability of the trial is not 
in doubt.  Under this narrow construction of Strickland, as developed 
below, many pretrial errors—failure to dismiss the indictment for de-
lay, the failure to secure a release on bail or the failure of counsel to 
challenge a Batson violation—would not be cognizable bases for re-
lief.  By contrast, insofar as the right to counsel is conceived of as pro-
tecting a fairness39
 
 37 Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 212 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
 that is distinct from, and in addition to, the relia-
bility of the jury’s guilt determination and the fairness of the trial 
itself, there is good reason to conclude that convictions secured on 
the basis of pretrial constitutional deficiencies caused by the errors of 
defense counsel are constitutionally unsound.  And this would be 
true regardless of whether the fairness of the trial itself is directly im-
plicated. 
 38 One of the notable features of the Lafler decision is its definition of the phrase “critical 
stage” so as to include any “proceeding in which defendants cannot be presumed to make 
critical decisions without counsel’s advice.”  Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 6 
(U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
 39 I use the term “fairness” throughout the Article because it appears throughout the Strick-
land decision itself.  It is, however, no less helpful to frame the question as one of correct-
ing injustice—that is, what constitutes an unjust conviction requiring reversal.  Cf. John C. 
Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz, Ineffective Assistance and Procedural Default in Federal Habeas 
Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 680 (1990) (considering circumstances when errors of 
counsel result in an “unjust conviction”). 
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In short, nothing less than the relevance of the right to counsel as 
a vehicle for protecting a wide range of pretrial rights is at stake.  The 
following section details the two competing conceptions of the right 
to counsel by tracing their origins in Supreme Court decisions.40
Notably, the Supreme Court’s guidance as to these competing 
models has been preciously sparse.  The Supreme Court has provided 
seemingly contradictory messages as to which fairness orientation re-
flects the appropriate function of the right to counsel.  Indeed, it is 
fair to say that over the years the right to counsel cases have exhibited 
something of a duality, at times embracing a robust approach to fair-
ness that extends well beyond the merits or legitimacy of the trial, 
and at other times announcing a rigidly trial-centered approach to 
the right that focuses on accuracy and the fairness of the trial itself.  
Even the Strickland decision itself is susceptible to accusations of am-
bivalence, if not outright inconsistency, on this point. 
 
Throughout the Strickland decision, for example, the Court 
stresses that any effort to “elaborate[] on the meaning of the consti-
tutional requirement of effective assistance” must be guided by the 
purpose of the right, namely, “to ensure a fair trial.”41
 
 40 Actually, three competing conceptions of the fairness protection underlying the Strickland 
right exist.  At one extreme, there are courts and commentators who regard the right to 
counsel as primarily a truth-seeking and innocence serving protection.  See, e.g., AMAR, su-
pra note 16, at 138–44.  On the other end of the spectrum are judges and commentators, 
like Martin Gardner, who understand the right to counsel as serving a set of purposes—
e.g. the privacy and integrity of the attorney client relationship—that are largely inde-
pendent of procedural fairness.  That is, they conceive of a right so robust that it can be 
violated even when no unfairness to the defendant occurs.  Martin R. Gardner, The Sixth 
Amendment Right to Counsel and Its Underlying Values:  Defining the Scope of Privacy Protection, 
90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 397, 404, 415 (2000).  A second but related approach to 
understanding the right to counsel is the view that the right to counsel properly unders-
tood involves a “constitutionally protected professional relationship.”  Brooks Holland, A 
Relational Sixth Amendment During Interrogation, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 381, 425 
(2009).  The idea behind this “relational” right to counsel is that the values underlying 
the Sixth Amendment are designed to “honor” and safeguard the relationship between a 
lawyer and a client, and it seems that the primary objective of this model is to construct a 
principled justification for abandoning the “attachment” doctrine insofar as it disadvan-
tages defendants who are arrested or investigated prior to the commencement of formal 
judicial proceedings.  Id.  At present, lofty conceptions of the right to counsel, like that 
articulated by Gardner, remain primarily aspirational, and their proponents readily con-
cede as much.  The third and final understanding of the protections embodied in the 
right to counsel is a compromise position.  Under this approach, the right to counsel only 
protects the fairness of the proceedings, but the fairness protection under this compro-
mise position is sufficiently capacious as to be violated even when the underlying reliabili-
ty or fairness of the trial is not in question. 
  And in ex-
plaining that the lawyer’s role is “to ensure that the trial is fair,” the 
Court went so far as to emphasize that a fair trial is one that merely 
 41 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). 
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produces a “just result.”42  Stated more directly, the Court explained 
that the right to counsel merely facilitates a “fair trial, a trial whose 
result is reliable.”43  But the focus on the trial itself and on the relia-
bility of the verdict stand in sharp contrast to other portions of Strick-
land that equate the right to effective assistance with a more general 
safeguard for the “fundamental fairness” and justness of the adver-
sarial process.44  The latter goal—an emphasis on the general fairness 
of the adversarial process—reflects a broad construction of the right 
to counsel.45  By contrast, the orientation towards reliable results and 
a procedurally regular trial reflect a narrow conception of the right to 
counsel.46
Given the conflicting messages regarding the purpose of the right 
to counsel in Strickland itself, it is not surprising that other decisions 
from the Court as well as scholarly commentary on the issue have 
been hopelessly unclear, if not irreconcilable in discussing the proper 
scope of the Strickland right.
 
47
 
 42 Id. 
 
 43 Id. at 687. 
 44 Id. at 696. 
 45 Justice Scalia has referred to the conception of the right to counsel that safeguards rights 
distinct from any impact on the reliability of a verdict as a “sporting chance theory of 
criminal law” that is oriented towards protecting “each player[s'] . . . fair chance to beat 
the house” rather than protecting reliable outcomes and valid convictions.  Lafler v. 
Cooper,  No. 10-209, slip op. at 13 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 46 Further ambiguity as to this point abounds in the Strickland decision.  466 U.S. 668 
(1984).  In one breath prejudice is defined as a reasonable probability that the “result” of 
the proceeding would have been different.  Id. at 694.  And in the next breath, the Court 
explains that a reasonable probability can be understood as a probability that “under-
mine[s] confidence in the outcome.”  Id.  These definitions are not necessarily incompat-
ible, but the likelihood of a different result and lack of faith or confidence in the result 
are not always equivalent.  One could be convinced, for example, that but for counsel’s 
errors a trial outcome would be different, perhaps because of counsel’s failure to sup-
press evidence, and nonetheless not have any reservations or shaken confidence about 
the validity and reliability of the ultimate verdict.  Likewise, perhaps one would lose con-
fidence in the guilty verdict of a jury if it was revealed that the prosecutor discriminated 
on the basis of race in selecting the jury, and yet there is no obvious reason to believe that 
such a confidence-undermining unfairness inherently infects the reliability of the verdict 
such that there is a reasonable probability that but for the discrimination there would 
have been a different result.  Cf. Harrington v. Richter, 131 S. Ct. 770, 791–92 (2011) 
(noting that there is only a slight difference between Strickland prejudice and requiring a 
showing that it is more likely than not that the result would have changed at trial). 
 47 Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 39, at 685–86 (describing the Court’s description of the pre-
judice requirement’s relationship to factual innocence as “mixed and inconclusive”). 
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A. Evidence of a Robust Approach to Fairness Prior to Frye and Lafler 
One way to conceive of the right to counsel is as a protection that 
extends beyond the fairness of the trial.  There is commentary and 
case law suggesting that the right to counsel serves more than the ac-
curacy or trustworthiness of the guilt determination.  According to 
this view, the right to counsel ensures a level of fairness and adequacy 
of procedure that is not exclusively instrumentalist in its application.  
The right to counsel, so understood, recognizes that the accuracy, 
and, even the fairness of the trial, are not the only outcomes that 
matter—that is to say, trial outcomes and procedures “are not every-
thing.”48  Prior to Lafler and Frye, there were four lines of cases sug-
gesting that the Sixth Amendment had a fairness orientation that is 
not limited to the trial itself49—Coleman v. Alabama,50 Kimmelman v. 
Morrison,51 Massiah v United States,52 and Padilla v. Kentucky.53
First, in 1970, the Court decided Coleman v. Alabama, which ad-
dressed the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing.
 
54  Coleman was 
handed down nearly fifteen years before the right to effective assis-
tance of counsel was announced in Strickland, and the analysis is ac-
cordingly limited to the issue of whether the preliminary hearing was 
a critical stage for which the appointment of counsel was required.  
Coleman held that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage, and 
this conclusion alone provides an important insight into the nature 
of the protections of the right to counsel.55
Although the right to counsel attaches as early the initial appear-
ance, the Court has unequivocally declared that it is not appropriate 
to assume that the “attachment” of the right to counsel necessarily 
requires the appointment of counsel.
 
56
 
 48 See Philip Halpern, Government Intrusion into the Attorney-Client Relationship:  An Interest 
Analysis of Rights and Remedies, 32 BUFF. L. REV. 127, 172 (1983) (“The right to counsel 
embraces two separate interests:  reliable and fair determinations in criminal proceed-
ings, and treatment of defendants with dignity and respect regardless of the effect on the 
outcome of criminal proceedings.”). 
  Instead, the right to the pres-
 49 In one sense the pursuit of “fairness” could be regarded as instrumentalist, but it is im-
portant to note that the non-outcome focused model of fairness elaborated upon in this 
section includes procedural unfairness that does not impede the ultimate fairness of the 
trial. 
 50 399 U.S. 1 (1970). 
 51 477 U.S. 365 (1986). 
 52 377 U.S. 201 (1964). 
 53 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010). 
 54 Coleman, 399 U.S. at 3. 
 55 Id. at 12 (Black, J., concurring). 
 56 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 211 (2008) (warning against the “mistake of 
merging the attachment question . . . with the distinct ‘critical stage’ question”). 
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ence or appointment of counsel is limited to circumstances in which 
the stakes are sufficiently high so as to render the proceeding in 
question a critical stage of the process.57  Moreover, the right to the 
appointment of counsel and the right to effective assistance have so 
far been regarded as coextensive, such that the right to “effective as-
sistance extends to . . . any proceeding as to which there would be a 
constitutional right [] to appointed counsel.”58  Consequently, Cole-
man’s holding that a defendant has a right to counsel at the prelimi-
nary hearing serves as an important data point in understanding the 
scope of the right to pretrial effective assistance.59
 
 57 Cf. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (“[I]n addition to counsel’s presence 
at trial, the accused is guaranteed that he need not stand alone against the State at any 
stage of the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence 
might derogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial.” (footnotes omitted)). 
  So long as Coleman 
remains good law, courts must choose either to recognize that defen-
dants are entitled to effective assistance of counsel at all proceedings 
roughly analogous to the hearing in Coleman, or take the unprece-
dented step of trifurcating the right to counsel into three tiers:  (1) 
attachment; (2) appointment; and (3) effective assistance.  That is to 
say, if a preliminary hearing is a critical stage, as the Court recognized 
in Coleman, then to hold that deficient performance of counsel that 
does not impact the fairness of the trial or the reliability of the guilt 
determination is not cognizable is to create a world in which:  (1) 
some defendants are not entitled to counsel (per the Gideon rule), 
(2) some defendants are entitled to counsel but are not entitled to 
the presence of counsel at a particular proceeding (per the critical 
stage analysis), and (3) some defendants who are entitled to the ap-
 58 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 17, at § 11.7(a).  Just as the right to counsel implies the right to 
effective assistance, the absence of the right to counsel at any stage of a proceeding dic-
tates that there can be no right to effective assistance.  See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 
501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (holding that where “[t]here is no constitutional right to an at-
torney in state post-conviction proceedings, . . . a petitioner cannot claim constitutionally 
ineffective assistance of counsel in such proceedings” (internal citations omitted)); Penn-
sylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (holding that because “[s]tates have no obliga-
tion to provide [post-conviction relief] . . . fundamental fairness mandated by the Due 
Process Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer as well [when the State 
chooses to supply such relief]” (internal citation omitted)). 
 59 At the very least, preliminary hearings that are similar in scope and nature to the hearing 
at issue in Coleman must be considered critical stages.  Notably, however, leading scholars 
speak of Coleman in general terms as recognizing preliminary hearings as a critical stage.  
See 2 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  
ADJUDICATION § 4.02 (4th ed. 2006) (“[T]he Court has found that . . . a preliminary hear-
ing . . . constitute[s] [a] ‘critical stage[],’ requiring the presence of counsel.” (footnotes 
omitted)).  Notably, the preliminary hearing in Coleman seems to effectively mirror the 
procedures of the federal preliminary hearing as defined by Federal Rule of Criminal 
Procedure 5.1. 
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pointment and presence of counsel have no enforceable right to the 
effective assistance of counsel.60
Given the inevitable logic in favor of ensuring that the right to 
appointed counsel is meaningful, it seems undesirable and unlikely 
that courts will trifurcate the right to counsel by disaggregating the 
right to appointed counsel from the right to effective assistance.  
Thus, assessing the nature of the proceeding at issue in Coleman, 
which is understood to justify the appointment of counsel, provides 
critical information about the scope of the right to pretrial effective 
assistance.  The Supreme Court summarized the Alabama prelimi-
nary hearing procedure as follows: 
 
The preliminary hearing is not a required step in an Alabama prosecu-
tion.  The prosecutor may seek an indictment directly from the grand 
jury without a preliminary hearing. . . . [T]he sole purposes of a prelimi-
nary hearing are to determine whether there is sufficient evidence 
against the accused to warrant presenting his case to the grand jury and, 
if so, to fix bail . . .61
Based on this description, it seems obvious that the preliminary hear-
ing is not primarily a safeguard on the fairness or reliability of the 
eventual trial.  There are certain aspects of the preliminary hearing 
that might impact the fairness of the trial, for example, the defense 
counsel may use the preliminary hearing to assess the State’s case 
“against his client” and to prepare a “defense to meet that case at the 
trial.”
 
62  But the central thrust of the Alabama hearing is the oppor-
tunity for counsel to secure bail for his client or to “expose fatal 
weaknesses in the State’s case that may lead the magistrate to refuse 
to bind the accused over [for trial].”63
To be sure, such probable cause testing designed to expose 
“weakness” in the prosecution’s case, and to a lesser extent the bail 
determinations, will often have preciously little to do with the fairness 
of the trial itself.  It is worth noting that the Court regarded the op-
 
 
 60 Notably, this position was taken for granted by lawyers arguing in support of the State in 
Lafler v. Cooper.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 12–13, Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip 
op. (U.S. Oct. 31, 2011) (arguing that deficient performance at the preliminary hearing 
is a paradigmatic example of the type of error that will not, as a general matter, have an 
“impact on the adjudication of guilt”); see also id. at 14 (showing counsel’s concession that 
the complete deprivation of counsel at the plea bargain stage would be permissible so 
long as the defendant ultimately pleads not guilty and has a fair trial).  Putting it in stark 
terms, the Michigan Solicitor General argued that “[one is] entitled to effective counsel 
at every critical stage; however, it is not a Sixth Amendment violation unless it casts doubt 
on the reliability of the adjudication of guilt.”  Id. at 15. 
 61 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8 (1970) (internal citations omitted). 
 62 Id. at 9. 
 63 Id. 
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portunity to challenge defects or weakness in the accusatory instru-
ment as a critical stage even though the appeal arrived at the Court 
after Coleman had already been found guilty at trial.64  Accordingly, 
the import of challenging the prosecution’s charges pretrial must be 
understood as resting on some consideration independent of the re-
liability or fairness of the trial, because, after all, the defendant was 
convicted in Coleman on the very charges that appointed counsel 
might have challenged as insufficient at a preliminary hearing.65  The 
reasoning in Coleman, then, lends support to the conclusion that the 
right to counsel serves fairness goals beyond the safeguarding of a fair 
trial.66  Such a view is shared by Bruce Green, who has explained that 
the right to counsel does more than enhance the reliability of the 
process, and instead must be recognized as facilitating the “availabili-
ty of other constitutional and procedural protections afforded crimi-
nal defendants.”67
The second case that provides substantial support for the view that 
Strickland’s guarantee of fundamental fairness must be liberally con-
strued is Kimmelman v. Morrison.
 
68  In Kimmelman, the defendant’s trial 
counsel “failed to file a timely suppression motion” based on viola-
tions of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, and the prosecu-
tion subsequently relied on unsuppressed evidence to secure a con-
viction.69  Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, emphasized that 
the failure to seek suppression was “not due to strategic decisions,” 
and instead was the product of a “startling ignorance of the law.”70
 
 64 Id. at 11 (concluding, ultimately, that a remand for harmless error review was appropri-
ate). 
  
Notably, there was no dispute that the unsuppressed evidence was en-
tirely reliable.  In other words, Kimmelman sought relief for a right to 
counsel violation based on the failure of his counsel to exclude relia-
ble but unconstitutionally seized evidence.  The majority held that 
inadequacies of this sort on the part of counsel violated the Sixth 
Amendment.  Specifically, the Court reasoned that if there was a rea-
 65 But see id. at 19–20 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasizing 
that in his view only errors that would taint the fairness of the trial would justify reversal). 
 66 Although Coleman is a plurality opinion there are five votes for recognizing the prelimi-
nary hearing as a critical stage.  Id. at 9–10; see also id. at 11–12 (Black, J., concurring) 
(supplying five votes for the view that a preliminary hearing is a “critical stage” and ex-
plaining that the right to counsel applies to all stages of the “criminal prosecution” and 
not merely those that are important to a vague notion of the “fair trial”). 
 67 Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction:  The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 78 IOWA L. 
REV. 433, 440–41 (1993) (footnote omitted). 
 68 477 U.S. 365 (1986). 
 69 Id. at 385. 
 70 Id. 
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sonable probability of success at the suppression hearing, and if suc-
cess at the suppression hearing would create a reasonable probability 
that the defendant would not have been convicted, then the right to 
counsel must be enforced so as to nullify the conviction.71
In other words, Kimmelman can fairly be read to stand for the 
proposition that the right to counsel can be violated if counsel fails to 
secure the exclusion of reliable evidence of guilt.  The right to coun-
sel permits the nullification of a reliable and otherwise fair guilty ver-
dict, a conclusion that strongly bolsters the view that the right to 
counsel should be understood as requiring a non-instrumental and 
broad conception of Strickland’s promise of fundamental fairness.  As 
the majority explained, “we decline to hold either that the guarantee 
of effective assistance of counsel belongs solely to the innocent or 
that it attaches only to matters affecting the determination of actual guilt.”
 
72
Notably, however, Justice Powell wrote a concurrence emphasizing 
that this issue was not actually decided by the Kimmelman decision.  
Justice Powell wrote for three Justices in order to emphasize that, al-
though interesting, the issue of whether the admission of relevant 
and reliable evidence can ever violate the right to counsel was not 
“raised by the parties nor discussed by the various courts involved in 
this case.”
 
73  The concurrence concludes that the proper scope of the 
opinion is limited to deeming such arguments forfeited.  And while 
Justice Powell concluded that it “appears” the majority has accepted 
this course, he wrote separately to criticize the majority’s broad lan-
guage that tends to suggest that the Court “resolved the broader 
Strickland issue.”74
 
 71 Id. at 389. 
  It is, therefore, plausible to conclude, as Professor 
Joshua Dressler does, that the “Court does not have a holding square-
ly resolving” the question of whether the right to counsel permits a 
court to set aside a reliable verdict predicated, at least in part, on in-
 72 Id. at 380 (emphasis added). 
 73 Id. at 391 (Powell, J., concurring).  In addition to the limitation advocated by Justice Pow-
ell, it is worth pointing out that even Kimmelman, perhaps the Court’s most robust appli-
cation of the right to counsel, is trial-centered in its application.  The Kimmelman majority 
emphasized that the right to effective assistance, unlike the Fourth Amendment, is a trial 
right, and, thus, because the failures of counsel had diminished the defendant’s oppor-
tunity to receive a full and fair trial, the right to counsel had been violated.  Id. at 374.  In 
other words, Kimmelman can be understood as rejecting a strict innocence or reliability 
focus but nonetheless reinforcing a trial-oriented right to counsel.  Moreover, Kimmelman 
might be read as reflecting the necessary force of the right to counsel in circumstances 
where counsel is necessary to protect a defendant against government misconduct that 
will prejudice the defendant at trial. 
 74 Id. at 391. 
1178 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:5 
 
admissible but reliable evidence.75  With few exceptions, however, the 
reaction to Kimmelman for the past two and a half decades has been to 
embrace the broad language from the majority opinion;76 indeed, 
lower courts have extrapolated from Kimmelman a general rule that 
attorney errors will typically justify setting aside reliable and otherwise 
legally sound convictions.77
Accordingly, Kimmelman has important implications for under-
standing the type of “fundamental fairness” protected by the right to 
counsel.
 
78  This is not to suggest that Kimmelman answers all of the 
questions.  In Kimmelman, the Court recognized that a jury verdict, 
though reliable, could be tainted by attorney error if there was a rea-
sonable probability of acquittal but for counsel’s mistakes.79
 
 75 DRESSLER & MICHAELS, supra note 59, at § 4.08[c][i]. 
  That is 
to say, it might be regarded as an unwarranted expansion of Kimmel-
man to conclude that procedural unfairness that does not call into 
question the likelihood of the verdict provides a basis for Sixth 
 76 In Owens v. United States, Judge Posner overruled a line of precedent that had adopted 
Justice Powell’s view of the Strickland test in the suppression context.  387 F.3d 607, 610–
11 (7th Cir. 2004).  Professor Carissa Hessick has observed that scholars “have criticized 
the [Strickland] prejudice standard” on the theory that “all defendants are entitled to ef-
fective representation, even if it would not alter the outcome of trial.”  Carissa Byrne Hes-
sick, Ineffective Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1079–80 (2009) (footnotes 
omitted).  A narrow reading of Strickland, however, undermines the force of Kimmelman 
and orients Strickland to concerns of truth-seeking, factual innocence, and trial fairness. 
 77 In Cave v. Singletary, for example, the court acknowledged the propriety of reversing an 
otherwise valid conviction when defense counsel had misapprehended the meaning of fe-
lony murder and proceeded on a capital defense based on this misunderstanding.  971 
F.2d 1513, 1518 (11th Cir. 1992).  Ultimately, the Court found no prejudice in that case 
because of the defendant’s confessions and overwhelming evidence of guilt; however, the 
critical point is that the court was willing to recognize that a conviction must, in circums-
tances of unfairness, be set aside despite the absence of any arguments against its reliabil-
ity.  Id. 
 78 One is forced to wonder whether the Roberts Court’s overt hostility to overturning con-
victions in the Fourth and Fifth Amendment contexts might have implications for the 
continued vitality of decisions like Kimmelman.  Cf. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 
2250 (2010) (upholding the denial of a motion to suppress inculpatory evidence from an 
interview where the defendant remained silent for the first two hours and forty-five mi-
nutes of a three-hour interrogation because such silence did not constitute defendant’s 
assertion of his right to remain silent); Maryland v. Shatzer, 130 S. Ct. 1213 (2010) (hold-
ing that defendant’s invocation of his Miranda rights did not apply to a subsequent inter-
rogation conducted three years later and consequently those statements could not be 
suppressed); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009) (holding that evidence ob-
tained pursuant to an arrest based on a warrant recalled months earlier could not be 
suppressed where the police had no knowledge that the warrant had been recalled). 
79  Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375 (1986) (“Where defense counsel's failure to 
litigate a Fourth Amendment claim competently is the principal allegation of ineffective-
ness, the defendant must also prove that his Fourth Amendment claim is meritorious and 
that there is a reasonable probability that the verdict would have been different absent 
the excludable evidence in order to demonstrate actual prejudice.”). 
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Amendment relief.  Kimmelman, in other words, while undermining 
centrality of reliability, does not diminish the importance of counsel 
in preserving a full and fair adversarial trial. 
In addition to Kimmelman and Coleman, there is a third line of cas-
es supporting a broad conception of the right to counsel that extends 
beyond mere fairness at trial, namely, the right to counsel cases that 
limit police confrontations with the individual.80  In Spano v. New 
York,81 the Court suppressed a defendant’s confession by holding that 
it had been obtained in a manner that was sufficiently coercive as to 
violate due process; however, four Justices concurred to explain that 
they regarded the post-charge police interrogation of the defendant 
in the absence of counsel as “an even more important ground [for 
the] decision.”82  The concurrence went so far as to postulate that 
“[d]epriving a person, formally charged with a crime, of counsel dur-
ing the period prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of 
counsel during the trial itself.”83  About five years later, in Massiah v. 
United States, a majority of the Court embraced the reasoning of the 
Spano concurrence and held that the right to counsel was violated 
when law enforcement officers deliberately elicited statements from 
the defendant after he had been indicted.84  The right to counsel, 
then, protects not against police badgering, which is the focus of the 
protections enshrined in Miranda v. Arizona,85 but rather, there is a 
sense that cases like Massiah reflect a generally “broad understanding 
of the fair trial interests served by the Sixth Amendment.”86
 
 80 See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) (holding that defendant was denied his 
constitutional right to counsel where police interrogated him after both the police and 
defendant agreed he would not answer questions until he conferred with his lawyer); 
Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (holding that evidence obtained from a ra-
dio transmitter planted in defendant’s automobile while defendant was out on bail and 
after defendant had already retained a lawyer could not be used in court). 
  It is not 
that the statements obtained without coercion post-charging are 
 81 360 U.S. 315 (1959). 
 82 Id. at 324 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 83 Id. at 325. 
 84 Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206. 
 85 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) (observing that the interrogation cases be-
fore the court all “share salient features—incommunicado interrogation of individuals in 
a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements without full 
warnings of constitutional rights”). 
 86 Professor Tomkovicz has persuasively argued that the Supreme Court’s decision in Fellers 
v. United States, 540 U.S. 519 (2004) evinces a “broader understanding of the fair-trial in-
terests” served by the right to counsel.  Tomkovicz, supra note 35, at 522.  These conclu-
sions, however, predate recent Sixth Amendment decisions.  See, e.g., Montejo v. Louisi-
ana, 556 U.S. 778 (2009) (permitting police to approach and interrogate a defendant 
post-attachment of the right to counsel so long as the defendant waives Miranda warn-
ings). 
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somehow unreliable and unfit to support a verdict; rather, there is a 
quasi-professional ethics tone to the Massiah rule that is fitting for a 
right that enshrines a wide range of fairness protections, not just fair-
ness of a verdict.87  In short, it is not just about the fairness of the trial; 
instead, the concern is with the integrity of the criminal process 
much more generally—that is, the right to counsel serves the goals of 
“fair play” and “parity” between defense and prosecution even when 
there is not yet a trial.88  It is a sense of fairness liberated from the 
outcomes or likely outcomes of the trial.89  And if the right to counsel 
simpliciter protects interests beyond the fairness and reliability of the 
verdict, then it stands to reason that the right to effective assistance of 
counsel must enjoy a similarly robust construction.90
Recently, however, the Supreme Court signaled that it was appro-
priate to regard the Massiah doctrine as substantially divorced from 
the requirements of a fair trial.  In Kansis v. Ventris, the Court held 
that statements obtained by police in violation of Massiah could be 
used to impeach a defendant.
  To be sure, the 
Supreme Court has only applied the Massiah doctrine as a vehicle for 
suppressing certain evidence at trial.  And in this way, Massiah itself 
might be understood as announcing a vision of the right to counsel 
that is thoroughly intertwined with the trial itself.  That is to say, one 
might argue that the Massiah line of cases is simply designed to en-
sure the fairness and reliability of the trial itself. 
91  But the implications of the holding 
might be considerably broader than the narrow issue of impeach-
ment at trial.  If the right to counsel is violated at the time of the po-
lice confrontation, then “[t]he interest protected there is [that of] 
being free from certain types of governmental exploitation and de-
ception, regardless of whether inculpatory evidence is obtained and 
used.”92
 
 87 See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 206. 
  Ventris suggests that the right to counsel is violated at the 
moment the officers attempt to elicit statements from a defendant, 
regardless of whether or not they are successful.  But, if the right to 
counsel can be violated prior to trial in circumstances that do not 
render the verdict or the trial itself unreliable or unfair, as Ventris 
 88 Tomkovicz, supra note 5, at 40. 
 89 Halpern, supra note 48, at 143. 
 90 Just as representation at trial serves as a gateway to a variety of statutory and constitutional 
rights that are not inherently related to guilt or innocence, pretrial representation pro-
vides benefits that are distinct from the fairness of the trial.  See Tomkovicz, supra note 5, 
at 40. 
 91 Kansas v. Ventris, 556 U.S. 586, 591–92 (2009) (discussing the Massiah protections of the 
Sixth Amendment). 
 92 Gardner, supra note 40, at 422 n.105 (quoting Halpern, supra note 48, at 143). 
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suggests, then by extension, the right to effective assistance of counsel 
might be understood to be triggered and violated even when the trial 
itself is not rendered unfair.93
There are two additional, less developed lines of cases that lend 
credence to the view that the right to counsel functions to protect 
procedural fairness distinct from, and even unrelated to, the fairness 
of trial.  First, there is a line of cases recognizing that in the context 
of the right to effective assistance of counsel for an appeal, the failure 
to file a timely appeal constitutes an automatic violation of the right 
to counsel, even if no prejudice can be shown.
 
94  This understanding 
of the right to an effective attorney for the first appeal as of right ap-
pears to enjoy support across the lower federal courts, including a 
panel decision for the Second Circuit joined by Sonia Sotomayor in 
2000.95  It must be noted, of course, that the right to counsel on ap-
peal is, technically speaking, regarded as a freestanding due process 
right.96  However, in practice, the right to appellate counsel has effec-
tively functioned as an extension of the right to counsel under the 
Sixth Amendment.  In fact, when a court sets out to determine 
whether the incompetence of appellate counsel amounted to ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel, the appropriate inquiry is whether the 
Strickland test is satisfied.97  Indeed, some lower courts apply Strickland 
to such claims without so much as a mention of the fact that the in-
quiry is actually one of due process rather than the right to counsel.98
 
 93 As Gardner had predicted, such a rule suggests that the Massiah cases are “aimed at de-
terring governmental violations of some substantive interest . . .  rather than merely pro-
tecting rights to procedural fairness by suppressing such evidence once it is obtained.”  
Gardner, supra note 40, at 434.  On the other hand, the Ventris decision is concerned, not 
with the core of the right to counsel, but only the prophylactic protections that inhere 
from the right under Massiah, and perhaps, the right to counsel proper cannot be vi-
olated until the trial, whereas the prophylactic Massiah right can only be violated prior to 
trial.  Cf. Chavez v. Martinez, 538 U.S. 760, 772–73 (2003) (recognizing that the Fifth 
Amendment’s prophylactic protection, Miranda, is only violated when statements are 
used at trial, but relying on the text of the Fifth Amendment—“in a criminal case”—for 
this distinction). 
  
It is, therefore, noteworthy that the courts are willing to infer ineffec-
tive assistance when the appellate lawyer fails to file a timely appeal 
regardless of the merits of the appeal in question; such reasoning 
implies, if only indirectly, that the right to counsel is sufficiently ca-
 94 See, e.g., Rodriquez v. United States, 395 U.S. 327, 329–31 (1969). 
 95 Hernandez v. United States, 202 F.3d 486 (2d Cir. 2000). 
 96 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 600–01 (1974) (explaining Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 
353 (1963), as a due process rule). 
 97 See, e.g., Hernandez, 202 F.3d at 489 (using the Strickland test to determine effectiveness of 
appellate counsel). 
 98 Id. 
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pacious as to protect procedural rights independent of the merits of 
the defendant’s defense or the fairness of his trial.99
Finally, and perhaps most revealing is the Padilla v. Kentucky deci-
sion, which considered the viability of ineffective assistance claims 
predicated on inadequate advice regarding the collateral conse-
quences of a plea bargain.
 
100  In Padilla, the Court stressed that “[t]he 
importance of accurate legal advice for noncitizens accused of crimes 
has never been more important” and emphasized that legal advice 
regarding immigration consequences are “an integral part—indeed, 
sometimes the most important part” of representation for persons 
who are considering pleading guilty.101  The Court went on to hold 
that defense counsel has an affirmative obligation to advise his client 
about the risks of deportation that flow from a plea bargain.102  This 
explicit recognition that something other than the trial, and some-
thing other than the criminal consequences, may constitute the most 
important aspect of appointed counsel’s duties, strongly suggests a 
conception of the right to counsel that is designed to safeguard pro-
cedural fairness entirely distinct from the question of guilt, reliability, 
or trial fairness.  That is to say, by suggesting that certain ancillary du-
ties of counsel are equally, if not more, important than the trial itself, 
Padilla supports a broad construction of the right to counsel.103
*  *  *   
 
In sum, there is an established line of cases and scholarship that 
supports the view that the right to counsel serves goals beyond safe-
guarding against trial unfairness or verdict unreliability.104
 
 99 Gardner, supra note 40, at 401–03 (devoting considerable attention to cases suggesting 
that governmental intrusions or interference with the lawyer-client relationship justifies 
relief even where no unfairness to the trial or proceedings ultimately results).  If Profes-
sor Gardner’s reading of these cases is correct, then this would lend additional support to 
the view that the right to counsel serves ends distinct from the instrumentalist goals of 
trial fairness and verdict reliability. 
  As the 
100 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 1486.  
103 The danger with reading Padilla too broadly is that the Court, while recognizing that ad-
vice relating to pleas may serve a more important function than representation at trial it-
self, remanded for consideration of whether the defendant had established Strickland pre-
judice.  Id. at 1478 (“Whether he is entitled to relief depends on whether he has been 
prejudiced, a matter that we do not address.”). 
104 See Halpern, supra note 48, at 133–36 (distinguishing between the Sixth Amendment’s 
“instrumental” purposes (i.e., meant to avoid “actual adversary prejudice to the accused”) 
and its “intrinsic” purposes (i.e., meant to vindicate “respect for intrinsic integrity of the 
accused”)).  Notably, Halpern had no occasion to contemplate the scope of the right to 
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Court has elaborated in the context of the right to counsel of choice, 
“[i]t is true enough that the purpose of the rights set forth in that 
Amendment is to ensure a fair trial; but it does not follow that the 
rights can be disregarded so long as the trial is, on the whole, fair.”105
B. Signs of a Trial-Centered Approach to Fairness 
 
In contrast to the broad non-trial-centered approach to Strickland 
discussed above, some scholars have argued that the right to counsel 
is nothing more than a basic check on the fairness of the verdict or 
the trial itself.  The appointment of counsel, so envisioned, is merely 
a means of facilitating the accuracy of the verdict.106  As Professor Ak-
hil Amar has summarized this viewpoint, “innocence protection and 
truth-seeking are, or should be, central” to our understanding of the 
proper scope of the right to counsel.107  The right to counsel, in other 
words, is provided “to enforce the law’s letter and spirit, not to evade 
them.”108  Such a view historically has found substantial support in the 
Supreme Court’s Sixth Amendment case law.109
 
effective assistance of counsel as a vehicle for what he calls the “intrinsic” ends because 
when his impressive paper was published, Strickland v. Washington had not yet been de-
cided. 
 
105 United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 145 (2006). 
106 Halpern, supra note 48, at 135.  The oral arguments in Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v. Frye 
contain arguments from the State party in both cases that endorse this narrow construc-
tion of the right to counsel.  The Michigan Solicitor General, for example, framed his en-
tire argument in Cooper around the principle that “in order to prove a Sixth Amendment 
violation, you have to demonstrate unreliability of the adjudicatory process.”  Transcript 
of Oral Argument at 5, Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. (Oct. 31, 2011); id. at 7 (ar-
guing that only when the “reliability of the adjudicatory process” is undermined can the 
prejudice prong be satisfied).  Under this view, there is a right to effective assistance only 
as to the guilty plea, and, by contrast, the right to counsel cannot be violated by advice 
leading one to exercise his trial right so long as the representation at trial was constitu-
tionally adequate.  Id. at 13 (during argument Justice Scalia explained that when a defen-
dant pleads guilty he deprives himself of the “24-karat test of fairness,” but when the de-
fendant gets a trial he cannot complain insofar as “you can’t do any better than that”).  
107 AMAR, supra note 16, at 138, 140–41 (examining “the innocence-protecting spirit” of the 
right to counsel and explaining that “without counsel [a defendant] runs an undue risk 
of being convicted, even if wholly innocent”). 
108 Id. at 141. 
109 Like the right to effective assistance of counsel, the due process right to have exculpatory 
evidence turned over by the prosecution has a prejudice standard that tends to be 
oriented towards reliability and innocence.  Leslie Kuhn Thayer, The Exclusive Control Re-
quirement:  Striking Another Blow to the Brady Doctrine, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 1027, 1049 (2011) 
(“In formulating Brady’s materiality standard, Bagley explicitly relied on and adopted the 
Strickland test for prejudice.”); see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682–83 (1985) 
(defining materiality by reference to the Strickland prejudice standard); see also Corinna 
Barrett Lain, Accuracy Where it Matters:  Brady v. Maryland in the Plea Bargaining Context, 80 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 39 n.183 (2002) (“Interestingly, the test announced in Strickland for es-
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First, it is not insignificant that the two cases most famously asso-
ciated with the Court’s recognition of an affirmative right to counsel 
as a fundamental right, Gideon v. Wainwright110 and Powell v. Ala-
bama,111 both provide symbolic, if not conclusive, support for the con-
clusion that the right to counsel is primarily an instrument of ensur-
ing a fair trial, and in particular that innocent persons are not 
convicted.  In Gideon, the Court explained that the defendant “who is 
too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel 
is provided for him.”112  Moreover, the Court emphasized that the 
right to counsel was consistent with a long line of “procedural and 
substantive safeguards designed to assure fair trials before impartial 
tribunals.”113  Donald Dripps has signaled his approval for such a 
reading of Gideon by emphasizing that the strongest support for the 
right to counsel is the Court’s recognition that such a right is “fun-
damental to a fair trial.”114  Likewise, in Powell, the Court’s insistence 
on the trial-based nature of the protection is explicit, as the Court 
explains that without a lawyer an indigent defendant “faces the dan-
ger of conviction because he does not know how to establish his in-
nocence.”115
 
tablishing prejudice was, in turn, based on one of three materiality standards employed in 
a previous Brady case, United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).”).  Notably, in the context 
of prosecutorial disclosure, the Court has held that pretrial disclosures (at the time of 
plea) are not necessary insofar as they do not serve the goal of protecting the innocent.  
United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002).  Given the doctrinal link between Brady 
claims and Strickland claims, it seemed likely that relief under Strickland would be limited 
to instances where the defendant could show that counsel’s errors undermined confi-
dence in the verdict.  Cf. Douglass, supra note 3, at 581–82 (encouraging an innocence 
focused conception of the Brady right). 
 
110 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
111 287 U.S. 45 (1932). 
112 Gideon, 372 U.S. at 344. 
113 Id. 
114 Dripps, supra note 21, at 266. 
115 Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.  Notably, however, there is language in Powell suggesting that the 
appointment of counsel is important for other reasons that do not seem linked to the ac-
curacy or fairness of the trial. For example, the Court suggests that the assistance of coun-
sel would allow a defendant to know whether he was facing invalid charges or a defective 
indictment.  Id. (explaining that the layman “is incapable, generally, of determining for 
himself whether the indictment is good or bad”).  Moreover, the issue presented in Gide-
on and Powell was only whether a trial could comport with fundamental fairness in the ab-
sence of counsel; the question of whether the right to counsel was similarly fundamental 
for preserving non-trial fairness was not at issue.  As the Court explained when it ex-
tended the right to counsel to sentencing in Mempa v. Ray, “[T]here was no occasion in 
Gideon to enumerate the various stages in a criminal proceeding at which counsel was re-
quired,” and the best way to understand Gideon is to recognize the force of the right to 
counsel at all stages “where substantial rights of a criminal accused may be affected.”  389 
U.S. 128, 134 (1967); see also Halpern, supra note 48, at 135 (characterizing Gideon and 
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The understanding of the right to counsel as a mere means of fa-
cilitating the ends of innocence protection, truth, and reliability is 
supported, in varying degrees, by other Supreme Court decisions.116  
The Court’s decision in Nix v. Whiteside is particularly significant in 
this regard.117
[W]e could not allow him to [testify falsely] because that would be per-
jury, and as officers of the court we would be suborning perjury if we al-
lowed him to do it; . . . I advised him that if he did do that it would be my 
duty to advise the Court of what he was doing and that I felt he was 
committing perjury; also, that I probably would be allowed to attempt to 
impeach that particular testimony.
  In Nix, the defendant was charged with murder based 
on a marijuana transaction gone bad, and the only issue was whether 
the defendant had a viable claim of self defense.  Defense counsel be-
lieved that Nix was embellishing the facts in support of his self de-
fense claim and explained their response as follows: 
118
Setting aside defense counsel’s threat to impeach his own client, 
which the Court did not address,
 
119 the Court considered defense 
counsel’s comments to his client to be proper under the governing 
rules of professional responsibility, and on this basis held that the de-
fendant could not make out a colorable claim of ineffective assistance 
of counsel.120
 
Powell as expressing an instrumentalist interest in the fairness of the proceeding, and not 
simply the innocence of the defendant). 
  The Court’s deficient performance analysis is of the 
most practical relevance to lower courts and practicing lawyers, but its 
holding regarding the prejudice prong is more conceptually interest-
ing.  As to deficient performance, the Court emphasized the general 
need for loyalty to the client, but explained that the duty is necessari-
ly “limited to legitimate, lawful conduct compatible with the very na-
116 In United States v. Cronic, the Court explained that the “underlying purpose” of the right 
to counsel is the preservation of “truth” in the criminal process.  466 U.S. 648, 655 
(1984). 
117 Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986). 
118 Id. at 161.  The Court summarized these events as follows:  Until shortly before trial, Whi-
teside consistently stated to Robinson that he had not actually seen a gun, but that he was 
convinced that Love had a gun in his hand.  About a week before trial, during prepara-
tion for direct examination, Whiteside for the first time told Robinson . . . that he had 
seen something “metallic” in Love’s hand.  Id. at 160–61. 
119 In light of the Court’s willingness to ground its holding in the ethical rules and the ethi-
cally proper response of counsel to the threat of perjury, it is interesting to note that de-
fense counsel was surely incorrect in his assumption that it would be ethically proper for 
him to impeach his own client on the witness stand, and yet the Court does not discuss 
the impact of unethical  threat. 
120 Notably, the federal habeas statute in effect at the time required the federal courts to de-
fer to the state court’s findings of fact, which included a finding that if the defendant had 
testified that he thought he had seen a gun it would have been perjury.  28 U.S.C. 
§ 2254(d) (2006). 
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ture of a trial as a search for truth.”121  In other words, the obligations 
of a lawyer extend beyond the client and protect the integrity of the 
judicial process.  Even a lawyer who utterly fails to advance his client’s 
interests may be acting in a manner sanctioned by the Sixth Amend-
ment when counsel is facilitating the discovery of truth to the extent 
permitted by the rules of professional responsibility.122
As to prejudice, the Court effectively holds that Strickland’s re-
quirement of a “reasonable probability” of a different outcome im-
plies that the different outcome would be sufficiently just and relia-
ble.
 
123  The Court has subsequently described the rule of Nix by 
observing that “[o]bviously, had the [defendant] presented false tes-
timony to the jury, there might have been a reasonable probability 
that the jury would not have returned a verdict of guilty,”124 and yet 
the Nix Court concluded that “it does not follow that [the defendant] 
was prejudiced.”125  The implication is that only certain alternative 
outcomes count for purposes of Strickland prejudice.126  The mere fact 
that a defendant may have prevailed, but for the actions of defense 
counsel, is not necessarily a basis for Strickland relief when the under-
lying guilt determination is fundamentally fair and factually reliable.  
The Court explained that because the defendant’s “truthful testimo-
ny could not have prejudiced the result of his trial,” there can be no 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, and thus the logic of Nix is 
not easily reconciled with the notion that the right to counsel is in-
fringed even when innocence is not in doubt.127
 
121 Nix, 475 U.S. at 166. 
  The model of fair-
122 Compliance with the ethical rules entirely insulates an attorney from a claim of deficient 
performance.  Id. at 175; McClure v. Thompson, 323 F.3d 1233, 1248 (9th Cir. 2003) 
(holding that if counsel was acting “to preserve the lives of the children rather than to 
protect the interests of his client, the ethical rule requiring an attorney to act to prevent a 
crime means that such an action” does not constitute deficient performance by counsel). 
123 Nix, 475 U.S. at 175–76. 
124 Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 370 (1993); see also Nix, 475 U.S. at 186–87 (Blackmun, 
J., concurring) (“To the extent that Whiteside’s claim rests on the assertion that he would 
have been acquitted had he been able to testify falsely, Whiteside claims a right the law 
simply does not recognize.”). 
125 Nix, 475 U.S. at 176. 
126 Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 39, at 686–88 (observing that Whiteside stands for the notion 
that prejudice cannot be established by attorney errors that “do not affect the factual re-
liability of the determination of guilt” and noting that “Whiteside and Kimmelman are hard 
to reconcile”). 
127 Nix, 475 U.S. at 176 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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ness protection envisioned by Nix seems more closely associated with 
a protection for the innocent against wrongful convictions.128
The narrow vision of the right to counsel suggested by Nix was 
substantially confirmed eight years later in Lockhart v. Fretwell,
 
129 when 
the Court held that defense counsel’s “failure to make an objection 
in a state criminal sentencing proceeding—an objection that would 
have been supported by a decision which subsequently was overruled” 
did not amount to a denial of effective assistance.130  In this case, un-
like Nix, the question of counsel’s deficient performance was readily 
satisfied, but the Court again held that there was no prejudice.  As in 
Nix, the Court suggested that errors of counsel resulting in unfavora-
ble outcomes only justify relief when the “reliability of the trial 
process” is called into question by the errors of counsel.131  The out-
come may have been different had counsel performed competently, 
but because the proceeding was reliable and otherwise fair, the Court 
held that the relief was unavailable.132  Emphasizing this narrow con-
struction of the right to counsel, the Fretwell majority explained:  “the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its 
own sake . . . [rather] [a]bsent some effect of challenged conduct on 
the reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is 
generally not implicated.”133
Accordingly, Fretwell and Nix are readily harmonized with Akhil 
Amar’s view that the right to counsel is fundamentally a “truth-
 
 
128 Kimmelman was decided only a few months after Nix, and yet the Kimmelman decision does 
not so much as cite Nix.  Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986).  The two cases are 
difficult to reconcile. 
129 506 U.S. 364 (1993). 
130 Id. at 366.  Counsel had failed to object to an aggravating factor (pecuniary gain) that was 
part of the predicate felony for purposes of felony murder.  Id. at 367.  Under the circuit 
court law at the time, this double-counting of the pecuniary aggravator constituted legal 
error and made the death sentence unlawful.  Id.  However, by the time the case was re-
viewed on federal habeas grounds, the double-counting of the aggravator was no longer 
legal error.  See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231, 233 (1988). 
131 Fretwell, 506 U.S. at 369. 
132 In Fretwell, the Court explicitly observes that “as a matter of law, counsel’s con-
duct . . . cannot establish the prejudice required for relief under the second strand of 
Strickland inquiry.”  506 U.S. at 370 (internal citations omitted). 
133 Id. at 369 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984)) (emphasis added); 
see also Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696 (1984) (“In every case the court 
should be concerned with whether . . . the result of the particular proceeding is unrelia-
ble . . . .”).  Notably, in Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 397 (2000), the Court rejected an 
overly broad reading of Fretwell by the Virginia Supreme Court.  In Williams, however, the 
state court had refused relief even when the defendant had shown that the result of his 
sentencing proceeding was factually unreliable—that is to say, Fretwell is not so broad as to 
insulate from reversal most attorney errors that undermine the factual reliability of a jury 
proceeding.  See Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 39, at 686–87. 
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seeking architecture;”134 but Fretwell and Nix are not alone in this re-
gard.  For example, in Gerstein v. Pugh, the Court held that there was 
no right to counsel, and, thus, implicitly no right to effective assis-
tance, at a probable cause determination because the absence of 
counsel at such a proceeding would not ultimately “impair [one’s] 
defense on the merits.”135  Thus, Gerstein stands for the proposition 
that the scope of the right to counsel is limited to safeguarding rights 
that relate to the merits of one’s case, and counsel is not constitu-
tionally required as a means of protecting procedures that are tan-
gential to the underlying strength of the prosecution’s case.  Empha-
sizing this point, Justice Alito recently authored a concurrence 
explaining that “defense,” as the term is used in the Sixth Amend-
ment, refers to “defense at trial, not defense in relation to other ob-
jectives that may be important to the accused.”136  Under this view, 
pretrial representation is required only when the “pretrial events may 
so prejudice the outcome of the defendant’s prosecution that, as a 
practical matter, the defendant must be represented at those events 
in order to enjoy genuinely effective assistance at trial.”137
Other lines of Supreme Court authority further entrenched the 
view that the right to counsel is not available to protect interests unre-
lated to the trial itself.  For example, in United States v. Cronic, the 
Court explained that the “core purpose of the counsel guarantee was 
to assure ‘Assistance’ at trial” and it elaborated that the right to coun-
sel’s “ultimate objective” was to ensure that the “guilty be convicted 
and the innocent go free.”
 
138
 
134 AMAR, supra note 16, at 141. 
  Even more interesting, William Stuntz 
135 Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975). 
136 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 216 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring). 
137 Id. at 217.  This concurrence is not merely of idle interest; it was joined by three Justices.  
Justice Thomas wrote a dissent expressing his narrower view of the Sixth Amendment, 
and Chief Justice Roberts provided a separate, but most cagey concurrence predicated on 
stare decisis.  There were, then, prior to Lafler and Frye, five potential votes for explicitly 
refusing to extend the right to effective assistance of counsel to pretrial appointments 
that do not have direct bearing on the outcome of the trial. 
138 Cronic, 466 U.S. at 654–55 (internal citations omitted).  This conclusion is further bols-
tered by the Court’s approach in cases involving government intrusions or interference 
with the lawyer-client relationship.  When the trial itself is tainted, for example, by refus-
ing the defense an opportunity to meet with his client, then no independent prejudice is 
required.  But when there is merely a government intrusion or interference with the law-
yer-client relationship unrelated to the trial, prejudice is required.  Compare United States 
v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361 (1981) (encouraging defendant to fire her attorney requires 
prejudice), and Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545 (1977) (intruding on private lawyer-
client meetings requires prejudice), with United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140 
(2006) (denying defendant counsel of choice does not require prejudice), Geders v. 
United States, 425 U.S. 80 (1976) (precluding an attorney from meeting with his client 
during an overnight break does not require prejudice), Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 
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went so far as to say that the defining limitations on the right to 
counsel, such as the attachment doctrine, are justified primarily by a 
desire to preserve the right to counsel’s preoccupation with truth 
seeking and fair trials.139  Stuntz has candidly observed that “lawyers 
retard evidence gathering” and, thus, the seemingly formalistic limi-
tations on the right to counsel prior to trial are designed as means of 
“counteracting lawyers’ efforts to shield guilty clients.”140  In other 
words, the attachment doctrine has developed so as to limit the ability 
of the right to counsel to foil the truth eliciting “staple of criminal in-
vestigation.”141  Stated more directly, limiting the attachment of the 
right to counsel until after the formal criminal proceedings have 
commenced “makes no sense if one sees the right to counsel as aim-
ing to benefit defendants as a whole, or even poor defendants as a 
whole.  It does make sense if the right aims to benefit innocent de-
fendants primarily.”142  The attachment rule itself, in other words, 
supports the conclusion that the right to counsel is oriented toward 
truth and trial fairness alone.143
 
853 (1975) (prohibiting a defense lawyer from providing a closing argument does not re-
quire prejudice), and Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972) (requiring a defendant to 
testify first does not require prejudice). 
 
139 An illustrative example of an attachment case is United States v. Hayes, 231 F.3d 663 (9th 
Cir. 2000), where the prosecution conducted depositions of material witnesses prior to 
the defendant’s indictment.  Id. at 667–68.  The defendant was required to attend the 
depositions and counsel was appointed so that the defendant would have an opportunity 
to cross-examine the witnesses.  During this period, the prosecution, without the presence 
of counsel, surreptitiously elicited incriminating statements from the defendant.  Id.  The 
Ninth Circuit held that although the defendant had been appointed counsel, and al-
though the facts closely resembled those of Massiah, because the right to counsel had not 
attached, there was no Sixth Amendment violation.  Id. 
140 William J. Stuntz, Lawyers, Deception, and Evidence Gathering¸ 79 VA. L. REV. 1903, 1906–07 
(1993). 
141 Id. at 1921. 
142 Id. at 1947.  Professor Stuntz further concludes that:   
Defense lawyers thus play a complicated and not altogether happy role in criminal 
litigation.  They are needed to ensure adequate separation of innocent from guilty 
defendants at trial, and in order to serve that function they must enter the picture 
soon enough to prepare a case for trial (and to enter into plea bargains).  Yet the 
earlier lawyers become part of the process, the greater the likelihood that their 
participation will be a relative benefit to the least deserving parties. 
  Id. at 1955. 
143 Just as the attachment limitation undercuts would-be efforts by counsel to obfuscate for 
the client, the critical stage doctrine’s limitation as to when counsel must be present likely 
serves a similar function.  See Metzger, supra note 12, at 1679–80 (arguing that pre-
sentence interviews should be regarded as a critical stage because the presence of counsel 
will help prevent the defendant from “blurt[ing] out information that increases his sen-
tence”).  But see United States v. King, 559 F.3d 810, 814 (8th Cir. 2009) (“[N]o court has 
found the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to routine presentence interviews.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Finally, the Court’s recent decision in Premo v. Moore, addressing 
ineffective assistance of counsel at the plea bargaining stage, also 
seemed to foreshadow a narrow conception of the right to pretrial ef-
fective assistance.144  In Premo, the defendant argued that his counsel 
had provided constitutionally inadequate representation by failing to 
suppress certain confessions before engaging in plea bargaining.145  
In assessing the appropriate standard for Strickland prejudice in the 
plea context, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the 
defendant was prejudiced because, but for counsel’s errors in failing 
to suppress a confession, there was a “reasonable possibility that [the 
defendant] would have obtained a better plea agreement.”146  In oth-
er words, the “different outcome” required by Strickland would be sa-
tisfied so long as a better plea offer was reasonably likely, even if there 
was no argument that the accuracy of the result or the guilt determi-
nation were impinged.  Relying on the deferential framework for re-
view under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the 
Court, without dissent, announced that the only clearly established 
standard for prejudice in this context requires the defendant to show 
“a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.”147  
Notably, in order to show a reasonable probability that one would 
have proceeded to trial, the defendant must show that it was reasona-
ble to proceed to trial—that is, that he had a reasonable chance of 
acquittal at trial.148  In other words, the Court insisted on a prejudice 
analysis for pretrial errors that required a trial-based showing of in-
jury.149
 
144 131 S. Ct. 733 (2011). 
 
145 Id. at 738. 
146 Id. at 745. 
147 Id. at 743 (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)); see also Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 
746 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
148 See Hill, 474 U.S. at 59 (“[W]here the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or 
discover potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error ‘preju-
diced’ the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on 
the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his rec-
ommendation as to the plea.  This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on a 
prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.”); 
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 17, at § 21.3(b) n.46 (“‘[T]he prejudice prong’ . . . is ‘unduly 
burdensome’ because it is ‘next to impossible for a defendant with no transcript and a 
hypothetical jury to prove an effect on the outcome of a hypothetical trial . . . .’”). 
149 To be sure, the analysis in Premo is of limited predictive utility insofar as the Court was 
primarily applying the onerous standard for relief under the habeas corpus statute for 
state prisoners, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), and in this vein the decision’s holding was limited to 
discussing what is the “clearly established” law on this question.  Nonetheless, the analysis 
seems to foreshadow a narrow view of the right to counsel.  Interestingly, the U.S. Solici-
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The deficient performance analysis in Premo is similarly indicative 
of a trial-centered conception of the right to counsel.  The Court rea-
soned that “at different stages of the case” the deference to trial 
counsel errors “must be measured in different ways,” and thus “when 
there is no extended formal record” like that from a trial, “and no 
factual history to show how the charges have played out at trial [this] 
works against the party alleging inadequate assistance.”150
*  *  *   
  In other 
words, the Premo case expressly enunciates a right to counsel frame-
work that is overtly hostile and unaccommodating to claims of pretri-
al ineffective assistance divorced from the strength of one’s likely suc-
cess at trial.  There is a higher standard for alleging errors of counsel 
in the rough and tumble context of pretrial bargaining, hearings, and 
litigation. 
In short, at least until recently, there has been substantial support 
for the view that the Warren Court’s willingness to pursue “social ob-
jectives extrinsic to reliable outcomes” has long since passed,151
III. FORESHADOWING A NON-TRIAL ORIENTATION FOR THE RIGHT 
TO COUNSEL:  THE FRYE AND LAFLER DECISIONS 
 and 
that the right to counsel has entered an era of increasing hostility to 
conviction-nullifying rules that serve freestanding goals. 
In March of 2012 the Supreme Court decided the Lafler and Frye 
cases, the aggregate effect of which is to drastically, if not definitively, 
announce a Sixth Amendment framework that is fundamentally di-
vorced from fair trial concerns.  In Missouri v. Frye, defense counsel 
failed to communicate a plea offer of ninety days in jail to Frye, and 
the plea offer expired.152  Later, Frye pled guilty without a plea 
agreement and was sentenced to three years in prison.153  Explaining 
that it “is well settled that the right to the effective assistance of coun-
sel applies to certain steps before trial,”154
 
tor General’s office has not shied away from relying on Premo as defining the constitu-
tional standard in this context.  See Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Missouri v. Frye, 
No. 10-444 slip op. (Oct. 31, 2011). 
 the Court held that “it is in-
150 Premo, 131 S. Ct. at 745 (“The added uncertainty that results when there is no extended, 
formal record and no actual history to show how the charges have played out at trial 
works against the party alleging inadequate assistance.”). 
151 Halpern, supra note 48, at 167–68. 
152 Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 2 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
153 Id. 
154 Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 3 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
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sufficient to simply point to the guarantee of a fair trial as a backstop 
that inoculates any errors in the pretrial process.”155  Accordingly, the 
Court held that the errors of counsel in causing his client to miss out 
on a favorable plea can amount to a Strickland deprivation.  Similarly, 
in Lafler v. Cooper, the Court held that deficient performance result-
ing in a defendant’s refusal to accept a favorable plea offer could 
amount to a right to counsel violation even when the defendant was 
ultimately convicted and sentenced through a full and fair trial.  Spe-
cifically, the Court in Lafler expressly rejected the suggestion that an 
“otherwise fair trial remedies errors not occurring at the trial itself.”156  
The Court expressly held that the Sixth Amendment is “not designed 
simply to protect the trial” and reasoned that errors by counsel result-
ing in a sentence that was more than three times as severe as the plea 
offer could be unconstitutional even if the trial was full and fair.157
Taken together these two decisions substantially eviscerate the 
view that the right to counsel is primarily a protection against unfair 
trials.  And the significance of this development was not missed on 
the four dissenting Justices.  Writing the dissents in both Missouri v. 
Frye and Lafler v. Cooper, Justice Scalia accused the majority of estab-
lishing “a whole new field of constitutionalized criminal proce-
dure.”
 
158  Of course, determining whether these decisions reflect a 
dramatic break from the previous Sixth Amendment jurisprudence 
depends on the extent to which one understands the Court’s pre-
vious decisions as having limited the right to counsel to those cir-
cumstances where the fairness of the trial was undermined.  For Jus-
tice Scalia, the case law discussed in Part II of this Article leads to the 
unmistakable conclusion that the purpose of the right to counsel was 
to “ensure a fair trial” or a “fair adjudication of guilt and punish-
ment.”159
Regardless of whether these cases were a product of the prior 
Sixth Amendment precedent or not, the holding that a full and fair 
trial does not suffice to undermine an otherwise colorable claim of 
ineffective assistance opens the door to a wide range of new Sixth 
Amendment claims.  More precisely, the scope of the right to pretrial 
effective assistance is substantially broader, or at least more certain, 
 
 
155 Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
156 Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
157 Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 6–7 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
158 Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 1 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
159 Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (de-
scribing the majority opinions as “a vast departure from our past cases”). 
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after Lafler and Frye.  The practical implications of this robust, non-
trial-centered understanding of Strickland are elaborated below. 
IV. UNDERSTANDING THE RIGHT:  CONSEQUENCES OF A BROAD 
CONCEPTION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
Because many pretrial procedural rights are, at best, tenuously re-
lated to the reliability of the verdict or the fairness of the trial, the ex-
tent to which the right to counsel extends beyond trial-related con-
cerns will oftentimes be determinative in considering whether a wide 
range of constitutional and statutory rights are protected by the right 
to effective assistance of counsel.  This section explores the implica-
tions of a broad understanding of the right to pretrial effective assis-
tance.  Specifically, it moves through four illustrative, though not ex-
haustive, examples of pretrial procedural (as opposed to factual) er-
rors by counsel and assesses the likelihood of Strickland relief under a 
broad rather than a narrow construction of the right to counsel. 
To be sure, the Court’s decisions in Frye and Lafler lend substantial 
support for the view that the pretrial errors of counsel, even if they 
do not undermine the fairness of the trial, can amount to a Sixth 
Amendment violation.  It remains to be seen, however, whether the 
Court will insist on a showing that the errors of counsel contributed 
to a less favorable outcome, in terms of convictions or sentencing for 
the defendant.160
 
160 In both Lafler and Frye the defendant argued that he received a more severe sentence be-
cause of the errors of counsel.  See Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 11 (recognizing 
that in order to “establish prejudice” a defendant generally must show a reasonable prob-
ability that the end result of the criminal process would have been more favorable in 
terms of the verdict or the sentence). 
  As illustrated below, the extent to which the Court 
limits the scope of pretrial effective assistance to errors impacting 
one’s conviction or sentence will ultimately determine whether the 
right to pretrial effective assistance is a valuable right in the context 
of claims unrelated to plea bargaining. 
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A. Petit Jury Selection161
The defense and prosecution in every jurisdiction are permitted a 
certain number of peremptory challenges.
 
162  These challenges per-
mit the party to strike a juror whom they fear is disposed to view the 
case unfavorably to their side, but for whom there is an insufficient 
basis to support a challenge for cause.163  The use of peremptory chal-
lenges, then, is not designed to remedy any actual bias, and the right 
to use a peremptory challenge is “not of constitutional dimension.”164  
The use of a peremptory challenge, however, is subject to important 
constitutional limits.  In Batson v. Kentucky, the Court held that a 
prosecutor’s use of peremptory challenges was constrained by equal 
protection principles such that the discriminatory use of peremptory 
challenges was unconstitutional.165  If, however, a defendant fails to 
raise a Batson violation prior to the empanelment of the jury, the 
claim is almost universally deemed to have been forfeited or waived.166
The crucial question for purposes of understanding more general-
ly the scope of the right to counsel protections is whether a defense 
 
 
161 Although the discussion here is limited to petit jury selection, in particular Batson claims, 
the analysis of failures by counsel to challenge the jury venire under, for example, Taylor 
v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), would raise nearly identical concerns if Strickland is nar-
rowly conceived.  See also Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254 (1986) (addressing constitu-
tional challenges to an improperly selected grand jury); Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 
791 (8th Cir. 2008) (concluding that counsel’s deficient performance as to voir dire ques-
tioning cannot give rise to Strickland prejudice when there was no demonstrated juror bi-
as on the part of the empanelled jurors). 
162 FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 (providing the prosecution with six and the defense ten peremptory 
challenges in non-capital cases); Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 98 (Fla. 2004) (“Today, 
every state provides peremptory challenges to both parties in criminal and civil cases.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
163 Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (“While challenges for cause permit rejection 
of jurors on a narrowly specified, provable and legally cognizable basis of partiality, the 
peremptory permits rejection for a real or imagined partiality that is less easily designated 
or demonstrable.” (internal citation omitted)). 
164 Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988). 
165 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (“Purposeful racial discrimination in selection 
of the venire violates a defendant’s right to equal protection . . . .”). 
166 As a leading treatise has explained, “Perhaps no standard governing the scope of appel-
late review is more frequently applied than the rule that an error not raised and pre-
served at trial will not be considered on appeal.”  7 CRIM. PROC. § 27.5(c) (3d ed.) (citing 
State v. Ford, 306 Mont. 517, 39 P.3d 108 (2001) (Batson claim waived when counsel 
failed to raise objection until the jury was empanelled and the venire was dismissed)); see 
also Christopher L. Ekman, Batson Challenges in State and Federal Courts in Alabama:  A Re-
fresher of Recent Decisions, 72 ALA. LAW. 46, 51 (2011).  (“From the standpoint of a party 
raising a Batson challenge, it is critical to voice that objection contemporaneously during 
the jury selection process and before trial begins, or else it may be waived.”); Sawy-
er v. Sw. Airlines Co., 145 F. App'x 238, 240–41 (10th Cir. 2005) (recognizing that a fail-
ure to raise Batson results in a waiver); 9B FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2472 (3d ed.), n.8. 
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lawyer’s failure to timely raise a valid equal protection claim in the 
context of jury selection can serve as the basis for nullifying an other-
wise reliable verdict.  Given the nature of the Batson right’s protec-
tions, the question of whether relief is available when counsel fails to 
vindicate the right is likely dependent on whether a narrow or broad 
construction of Strickland is applied.  That is to say, a reading of Frye 
and Lafler that stresses a conception of the right to counsel that is di-
vorced from a fair trial is of the utmost importance to understanding 
the extent to which Batson provides a cognizable basis for right to 
counsel relief. 
The first critical step in this analysis is recognizing that the nature 
of the Batson right is such that the failure of counsel to vindicate this 
right does not inherently undermine the reliability or fairness of the 
verdict.  The Batson case itself involved a prosecutor’s attempt to re-
move all of the African American jurors from the venire so as to leave 
an African American defendant with an all-white jury, but subsequent 
decisions have abandoned reliance on the significance of the com-
mon racial identity between the defendant and the excused jurors.167  
Moreover, the Court has even held that Batson serves as a limitation 
on the use of peremptories by the defense.168  In light of these adapta-
tions, Batson is now primarily a “symbolic,” public “cynicism”-avoiding 
and “public confidence”-enhancing, right;169 it serves ends indepen-
dent of “protect[ing] individual defendants”170 and the fairness of the 
trial.171
 
167 See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 402 (1991) (holding that “a criminal defendant may 
object to race-based exclusions of jurors effected through peremptory challenges whether 
or not the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race”). 
  Batson is now generally regarded as a third-party protection 
for the jurors and the judicial system more than a protection for the 
168 See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 55 (1992) (“[A] defendant’s discriminatory exer-
cise of a peremptory challenge is a violation of equal protection . . . .”). 
169 Id. at 49. 
170 Powers, 499 U.S. at 406; see id. (“In Batson, we spoke of the harm caused when a defendant 
is tried by a tribunal from which members of his own race have been excluded.  But we 
did not limit our discussion in Batson to that one aspect of the harm caused by the viola-
tion.  Batson was designed to serve multiple ends, only one of which was to protect indi-
vidual defendants from discrimination in the selection of jurors.” (internal citation and 
quotation marks omitted)). 
171 In addressing the retroactivity of Batson, the Court, in Allen v. Hardy, held that it was not 
appropriate to apply it retroactively because under then governing law the question was 
whether “a new constitutional principle is designed to enhance the accuracy of criminal 
trials.” 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986) (per curiam) (internal citation omitted).  In other words, 
the Court held that truth-protecting function of the trial is not necessarily enhanced by 
the Batson rule. 
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defendant himself.172  Indeed, rather than holding that a fair trial was 
not possible without the Batson protection, the Court, at times, has 
been forced to defend the Batson right as narrowly compatible with 
the fair trial right itself.173  That is to say, the Batson right is not pri-
marily, or perhaps at all, about enhancing impartiality or reliability, 
because such concerns, the Court has explained, are adequately safe-
guarded in this context through challenges for cause.174
Given the purpose of the Batson protection, divorced as it is from 
trial fairness, the viability of a claim of ineffective assistance of coun-
sel in this context is contingent on the acceptance of a narrow or a 
broad conception of the fairness protection underlying the right to 
counsel.  If the right to counsel serves as a broad promise of fairness 
such that the right is violated whenever counsel’s errors deprive the 
defendant of a material procedural protection, then the failure to 
timely raise a Batson claim justifies reversal.
 
175
Construing the right to counsel broadly, in Lafler the Court held 
that a conviction resulting from a fair trial must be set aside when er-
rors by counsel caused the defendant to forego a favorable plea offer.  
Consider the potential application of Lafler v. Cooper in this context.  
By analogy, a defendant who receives a fair trial and is convicted by 
  Alternatively, if the 
right to counsel is construed narrowly so as to require some unfair-
ness at the trial stage, or some unreliability of the verdict, then a 
guilty verdict issued by an unbiased jury following a fair trial would 
not justify relief. 
 
172 For example, one scholar has remarked that:  “The fact is that Batson only makes analyti-
cal sense if one recognizes that it has shifted the primary focus from the rights of the litigants to 
the rights of prospective jurors.”  Kenneth J. Melilli, Batson in Practice:  What We Have Learned 
About Batson and Peremptory Challenges, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 447, 453 (1996) (footnote 
omitted) (emphasis added).  Another scholar’s defense of Batson makes no effort to justi-
fy the doctrine in terms of the defendant’s right to a fair trial, or the need for a reliable 
verdict; instead the focus is on enforcing an ethical standard on lawyers.  See Laura I. Ap-
pleman, Reports of Batson’s Death Have Been Greatly Exaggerated:  How the Batson Doctrine En-
forces a Normative Framework of Legal Ethics, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 607, 609–10 (2005).  For a 
contrary perspective, see Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 39, at 717 (explaining their view 
that, at least prior to the most recent line of Batson decisions, the rule could be unders-
tood as “designed to secure just outcomes” but recognizing that the rule may not pro-
mote accuracy of the verdict in “any particular case”). 
173 In holding that a defendant could violate Batson, the Court explained that “[i]t is an af-
front to justice to argue that a fair trial includes the right to discriminate” during jury se-
lection.  Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 57 (1992) (explaining that if the cost of a fair 
trial requires such discrimination, then the cost is “too high”). 
174 McCollum, 505 U.S. at 59 (rejecting “the view that assumptions of partiality based on race 
provide a legitimate basis for disqualifying a person as an impartial juror”). 
175 See also Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961) (suggesting that the right to counsel 
is necessary to protect any claim or defense that would otherwise be permanently for-
feited or lost). 
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an unbiased jury is still entitled to reversal for a Batson error if there is 
a reasonable probability that but for the errors of counsel the defendant would 
have been tried by a different jury.176  In other words, there must be a rea-
sonable probability that the defendant would have prevailed on a 
timely Batson motion—that is, a reasonable probability of a different 
outcome at the relevant proceeding.177  Relief in these circumstances 
is entirely independent of a claim that the trial would have been dif-
ferent with the proper jury.178
By contrast, under a narrow construction of Strickland, like that 
urged by the state in Frye and Lafler, a court would not find a Sixth 
Amendment violation when counsel fails to timely raise Batson viola-
 
 
176 See Davis v. Sec’y for Dep’t of Corr., 341 F.3d 1310, 1316 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding that 
the prisoner established a reasonable probability that state courts would have reversed his 
conviction had his ineffective trial counsel preserved his Batson claim for review on ap-
peal, and, thus, granting federal habeas relief); Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 
59, 65 (3d Cir. 1989) (“[I]f there was a Sixth Amendment violation the remedy will be to 
give Forte what he should have gotten in the first place, an explanation from the prosecu-
tor as to why she used her peremptory challenges and a ruling by the court on whether 
Forte has established that there was purposeful discrimination.  Of course, if the court 
concludes that there was a Fourteenth Amendment violation his conviction and sentence 
will be vacated.”); see, e.g., Davidson v. Gengler, 852 F. Supp. 782, 783 (W.D. Wis. 1994) 
(holding that in the Batson context, the “test for determining prejudice on an ineffective 
assistance claim is not whether the outcome of the trial would have been different, 
but . . . whether the results of [the] jury selection process would have been different had 
a Batson objection been made.”). 
177 This view seems to best capture the spirit of Batson’s protections insofar as Batson errors 
are structural.  See, e.g., Eagle v. Linahan, 279 F.3d 926, 943 (11th Cir. 2001) (“Where, as 
here, appellate counsel fails to raise a [Batson] claim on appeal that is so obviously valid 
that any competent lawyer would have raised it, no further evidence is needed to deter-
mine whether counsel was ineffective for not having done so.”); Tankleff v. Senkowski, 
135 F.3d 235, 248 (2d Cir. 1998) (holding that Batson violations are structural error); Da-
vis, 341 F.3d at 1317 (11th Cir. 2003) (noting that most circuits appear to regard Batson as 
structural error); Ex parte Yelder, 575 So. 2d 137, 138–39 (Ala. 1991) (concluding that a 
presumption of prejudice, as with cases of actual conflicts of interest by counsel, is appro-
priate when defense counsel fails to raise a colorable Batson claim). 
178 The circuits have split on the related question of whether defense counsel’s failure to 
take any action when a juror is exposed to prejudicial information pretrial—e.g., a pe-
remptory strike, or even confirming that the juror will decide the case based on the evi-
dence presented—can give rise to relief under the Sixth Amendment even if the juror ul-
timately was not prejudiced.  Compare Fields v. Brown, 503 F.3d 755, 775–76 (9th Cir. 
2007) (holding that defendant was not prejudiced by counsel’s deficient questioning dur-
ing voir dire where habeas evidentiary hearing revealed that jurors who served were not 
actually biased), and Sanders v. Norris, 529 F.3d 787, 790–94 (8th Cir. 2008) (same), with 
Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126, 146 (3rd Cir. 2011) (“The proper inquiry under Strick-
land is not whether [the juror was] actually rendered [] biased or partial, but whether 
there is a reasonable probability that a juror who had not been exposed to that statement 
would have voted to acquit . . .”); id. (holding that the prisoner “was not required to show 
that [the juror] was actually influenced by [the] statement, but had only to show a rea-
sonable probability that any given juror would have been”). 
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tions.179  A state appellate court in Missouri summarized this view 
when it rejected an attorney’s improper and incomplete Batson objec-
tion as establishing ineffective assistance:  “Post-conviction relief for 
ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to errors which prejudiced 
the movant by denying him a fair trial.  The failure to properly pre-
serve Batson claims for review on appeal is not . . . cognizable.”180  
Likewise, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance in this context by observing that, “Batson [does] not go 
‘to the heart of the truthfinding function,’” and therefore, it “cannot 
be said that the violation of such rule renders the trial unfair and the 
verdict suspect.”181  Similarly, having concluded that the “discrimina-
tory exercise of peremptory challenges” is not primarily a safeguard 
of the defendant’s own rights,182 a series of Eighth Circuit decisions 
has also denied right to counsel relief in these circumstances.  In 
Young v. Bowersox, for example, the court rejected the defendant’s ar-
gument that the nature of Batson claims as structural error ought to 
trump the Strickland requirement of prejudice.183  The court held that 
an error of counsel in failing to raise a Batson claim did not warrant 
Strickland relief “if the error had no effect on the judgment.”184
 
179 See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 6 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) (noting the gov-
ernment’s argument that the right to counsel should be strictly limited so as to protect 
nothing more than the “fair trial”). 
  The 
court explained that the focus of Strickland’s prejudice inquiry must 
be “on the outcome of the individual trial,” and in the absence of a 
showing of bias on the part of the jury, the removal of minorities, or 
180 State v. Link, 965 S.W.2d 906, 912 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998) (citing the state’s post-conviction 
rule, Rule 29.15, which allows for relief when a defendant’s conviction violates the “laws 
of this state or the constitution of the United States”); see also Strong v. State, 263 S.W.3d 
636, 647 (Mo. 2008) (en banc) (finding an absence of prejudice because the defendant’s 
allegation of Batson error, taken as true, does not establish “a reasonable probability that 
[defendant] would have been found not guilty”). 
181 State v. Snyder, 750 So. 2d 832, 842 (La. 1999) (internal citations omitted); see also Strong 
v. State, 263 S.W.3d 636 (Mo. 2008) (holding that failure to raise religious objections did 
not constitute a Batson violation); Smith v. State, 877 So. 2d 369 (Miss. 2004) (holding 
that theoretical and statistical conjecture of racial prejudice in jury selection was not suf-
ficient to claim ineffective assistance under Batson); Wardley v. State, 760 So. 2d 774 
(Miss. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that prejudice could not be satisfied because defendant 
could not prove reasonable probability of a different verdict in the absence of Batson vi-
olation); Batiste v. State, 888 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (holding that prejudice 
must be shown from a failure to make a Batson objection); Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, 
Adequacy of Defense Counsel’s Representation of Criminal Client Regarding Right to and Incidents 
of Jury Trial, 3 A.L.R. 4th 601, § 5[b] (1981) (compiling cases raising ineffective assistance 
of counsel claims based on counsel’s failure to raise a Batson violation) 
182 Davis v. Sec’y for Dep’t. of Corr., 341 F.3d 1310, 1317 (11th Cir. 2003). 
183 161 F.3d 1159, 1160–61 (8th Cir. 1998). 
184 Id. at 1161 (internal citations omitted). 
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women, or religious groups cannot give rise to a right to counsel de-
privation.185  Even more revealing, just last year the Illinois Supreme 
Court held that when a defendant receives ineffective assistance of 
counsel that results in a biased juror actually being seated on the jury, 
he is still not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate a specific 
injury to his trial rights, for example, that the evidence at trial was 
substantially lacking such that a fair jury would not have found him 
“guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.”186
In short, as the Batson right has become less about protecting the 
defendant from a biased jury or an unreliable verdict and more about 
protecting the third-party rights of the jurors themselves, the failure 
to raise such a claim does not justify relief under a trial-oriented con-
ception of the right to counsel.
 
187
But much has changed since each of these cases applying Strick-
land to the jury selection process were decided.  The judicial obses-
sion with a showing of innocence or unfairness of the verdict
  Simply put, a narrow conception of 
Strickland cannot countenance relief when trial counsel fails to raise a 
valid Batson claim; as the decisions just mentioned note, the defen-
dant is not deprived of his constitutionally protected right to a fair 
trial when counsel negligently, gratuitously, or even intentionally fails 
to raise a valid Batson claim. 
188 is in 
stark contrast with Lafler’s holding that a fair trial does not cure con-
stitutionally ineffective pretrial representation.189
 
185 Id. (quoting Wright v. Nix, 928 F.2d 270, 274 (8th Cir. 1991)); see also Teague v. Scott, 60 
F.3d 1167, 1172 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[A]ttorney[s’] actions during voir dire are considered 
to be a matter of trial strategy.  A decision regarding trial tactics cannot be the basis for a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel unless counsel’s tactics are shown to be so ill 
chosen that it permeates the entire trial with obvious unfairness.”); Scott v. State, 183 
S.W.3d 244, 248 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005) (“It is well-settled that post-conviction relief based 
on ineffective assistance of counsel is limited to errors which prejudiced a movant by de-
nying that movant the right to a fair trial.”). 
  A missed plea offer, 
no more than a botched voir dire, may not impede the ultimate re-
liability of the proceeding, but to limit the right to counsel to trial-
186 People v. Manning, 948 N.E.2d 542, 548 (Ill. 2011). 
187 Many of the Batson cases, even the cases clarifying that Batson provides a defendant with 
third-party standing to challenge the equal protection injury to the jury, continue to insist 
that a Batson violation causes a “criminal defendant cognizable injury.”  Powers v. Ohio, 
499 U.S. 400, 411 (1991).  But the “injury” allegedly suffered by the defendant is reputa-
tional harm to the “integrity of the judicial process,” and the injury to a juror in being 
removed on improper grounds has been described as a defect in the “fairness of a crimi-
nal proceeding.”  Id. (internal citations omitted). 
188 See, e.g., Hall v. State, 663 S.W.2d 926, 927–28 (Ark. 1984) (Adkisson, C.J., dissenting) (“A 
procedural rule must not take precedence over an uncontested adjudication of guilt.”). 
189 Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
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type fairness is to fail to “comprehend the full scope of Sixth 
Amendment protections.”190
B.  Speedy Trial Claims 
 
Professor Akhil Amar once wrote that it is the right to counsel that 
“makes real” the guarantees of the speedy trial protection.191  The very 
essence of the right to counsel is its ability to assist defendants with 
this sort of “technical procedural law:  where to file, with what words, 
before whom, and so on.”192
On the one hand, ineffective assistance resulting in the depriva-
tion of a speedy trial claim would seem to have a strong claim to 
Strickland relief.  To be sure, one could establish that but for the er-
rors of counsel the “result” or the “outcome” would be different in 
that the defendant would not have been convicted.
  As with a Batson claim, however, the fail-
ure of counsel to raise a viable speedy trial claim may not result in an 
unfair trial or an unreliable verdict. 
193  The ultimate 
outcome of the case was, as in Lafler and Frye, less favorable to the de-
fendant because of the errors of counsel.194  But such relief is not like-
ly, or at least not obviously available under the narrow, trial-centered 
construction of Strickland.195
Notably, the speedy trial protection is not primarily a safeguard on 
the fairness or reliability of the trial.  In discussing the constitutional 
 
 
190 Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 10 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012).  Notably, however, even 
in Frye and Lafler, there was a reasonable probability that the errors of counsel deprived 
the defendant of a more favorable outcome—not a fair trial, but a reduced sentence.  By 
contrast, there is no probability of a more favorable ultimate outcome when Batson is vi-
olated.  The defendant could show a reasonable probability of a different jury—that is, a 
different voir dire.  But it remains unclear whether Lafler and Frye require relief in these 
circumstances. 
191 AMAR, supra note 16, at 139. 
192 Id. 
193 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 465 (1938) (“The purpose of the constitutional guaranty 
of a right to counsel is to protect an accused from conviction resulting from his own ig-
norance of his legal and constitutional rights . . . .”); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 
362, 396 (2000) (endorsing a relatively outcome-centered approach to Strickland). 
194 In particular, Frye and Lafler suggest that for purposes of establishing a reasonable proba-
bility of a different outcome, the outcome need not be a fair trial, or any other particular 
outcome.  The failure to vindicate one’s speedy trial rights certainly implicates the out-
come—i.e., the viability of the conviction.  Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444, slip op. at 7 (U.S. 
Mar. 21, 2012); Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 7 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
195 Professors Jeffries and Stuntz would seemingly endorse this conclusion as a natural con-
sequence of the narrow conception of the right to counsel they urged the Court to adopt 
more than two decades ago.  See Jeffries & Stuntz, supra note 39, at 723 (explaining that so 
understood, counsel is merely an “aid to accurate results” and not an “end in itself” and 
observing that effective assistance ought to be a “tool for reaching right results”). 
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right to a speedy trial, the Court has observed that prolonged delays 
may “impair the ability of an accused” to obtain a fair trial,196 and in 
Barker v. Wingo, the Court set forth four factors for determining 
whether a speedy trial harm has occurred, one of which is “prejudice” 
to the defendant.197  But the Court has also emphasized that the 
speedy trial right is different from most other constitutional rights in 
that it actually protects “a societal interest in providing a speedy trial 
which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the interests 
of the accused.”198  That is to say, the speedy trial right, though theo-
retically justified in part by the defendant’s fair trial concerns, is 
unique insofar as a “deprivation of the right may work to the ac-
cused’s advantage.”199  Certainly, if a defendant’s right to counsel is 
understood as contingent upon a showing of trial unfairness or unre-
liability, then speedy trial claims that actually “work to the accused’s 
advantage” could not be the source of relief.200  Doggett v. United States 
confirms this conclusion.201
In Doggett, the Court found that a lengthy delay between Doggett’s 
indictment and trial constituted a speedy trial violation even though 
Doggett did not know about the indictment and appeared to have 
suffered no particularized prejudice because of the delay.
 
202  Justice 
O’Connor dissented in Doggett in order to reject the majority’s view 
that the mere “possibility of prejudice” is sufficient to warrant speedy 
trial relief and argued that a defendant should be required to make 
“a showing of actual prejudice.”203  Doggett is significant, therefore, be-
cause it expressly held that “affirmative proof of particularized preju-
dice is not essential to every speedy trial claim.”204
Because a deprivation of the speedy trial right does not require 
actual injury to the integrity or the reliability of the defendant’s trial, 
under a trial-centered conception of Strickland, a defendant’s right to 
 
 
196 United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). 
197 The four factors are:  “length of delay,” “reason” for the delay, “whether and how the de-
fendant asserts [the] right,” and “prejudice.”  Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972).   
198 Id. at 519. 
199 Id. at 521. 
200 Id. at 521 (noting that a “difference between the right to speedy trial and the accused’s 
other constitutional rights is that deprivation of the right may work to the accused’s ad-
vantage”). 
201 505 U.S. 647 (1992). 
202 Id. at 670 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court compels dismissal of the charges against 
Doggett not because he was harmed in any way by the delay between his indictment and 
arrest, but simply because the Government’s efforts to catch him are found wanting.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
203 Id. at 659 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
204 Id. at 655. 
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counsel may not be violated when his attorney fails to seek dismissal 
of a case pretrial based on a viable speedy trial claim.  As one state 
court judge has explained this view, “an attorney’s failure to raise a 
speedy trial claim is not ineffective assistance of counsel because the 
procedural rules setting the time for trial do not impinge on the in-
tegrity” of a guilty verdict or plea.205  In other words, a successful 
speedy trial claim does not involve a showing that the defendant was 
“denied a fair determination of his guilt” and, thus, there is no color-
able basis for establishing Strickland prejudice.206
To date, however, most lower courts that have addressed the issue 
hold that the failure of counsel to raise a valid speedy trial claim that 
would have resulted in dismissal justifies reversing a guilty verdict.
 
207
 
205 Hall v. State, 663 S.W.2d 926, 927 (Ark. 1984) (Adkisson, C.J., dissenting). 
  
For example, the Indiana Court of Appeals has explicitly held that a 
defendant is denied his constitutional right to effective assistance of 
counsel when his counsel fails to secure a defendant’s discharge 
206 Id. at 927–28.  Notably, Justice Adkisson’s opinion was issued just months prior to the 
Strickland decision.  It appears, however, that at the time of the decision Arkansas was ap-
plying a very similar standard, requiring a failure by counsel that prejudiced the defen-
dant.  Id. 
207 My research has not revealed a single claim in which a federal defendant has obtained 
the reversal of a conviction based on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel predi-
cated on a failure of counsel to raise a claim under the Speedy Trial Act.  There are a 
substantial number of cases that reason that, even if the time limits of the Act were vi-
olated, the failure of counsel to raise the issue did not prejudice the defendant insofar as 
it is within the discretion to dismiss the case without prejudice.  See, e.g., Bramlett v. Unit-
ed States, 405 F. App’x 363, 368 (11th Cir. 2010) (noting that because dismissal without 
prejudice would have been the appropriate remedy, “a competent attorney . . . reasonably 
could have decided that filing a motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds would have on-
ly delayed further the resolution of the charges”); Chambliss v. United States, 384 F. 
App’x 897 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We need not address whether petitioner's trial counsel pro-
vided constitutionally deficient performance by failing to move for dismissal of the in-
dictment because we conclude that petitioner did not suffer prejudice. If counsel had 
moved to dismiss the indictment, the district court would have granted a dismissal with-
out prejudice because of the serious nature of the charges and because the delay did not 
harm petitioner's ability to present a defense.”); Burrus v. Gonzalez, 97 F. App’x 803 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (considering the application of an analogous state speedy trial act); United 
States v. Jackson, 22 F. App’x 396, 398 (6th Cir. 2001) (“[H]e has not demonstrated a rea-
sonable probability that the district court would have dismissed the indictment with pre-
judice.” (internal citations omitted)).  This is a somewhat troubling trend.  It is the spee-
dy trial safeguard that ensures that the anxiety and dangers of pretrial detention are 
mitigated to the greatest extent possible, and it is the right to counsel that is regarded as 
the guardian of the right to a speedy trial.  AMAR, supra note 16, at 139.  If the right to 
counsel cannot be enforced when counsel fails to raise viable claims of trial delay, then 
the harms of the trial delay are amplified rather than mitigated by the services of counsel.  
See Bramlett, 405 F. App’x at 368 (explaining that “[w]here the crime charged is serious, 
the [district] court should dismiss [with prejudice] only for a correspondingly severe de-
lay” (internal citations omitted)). 
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through the filing of a timely and valid motion to dismiss on speedy 
trial grounds.208  Other courts have also recognized the availability of 
relief in this context,209 and such a result is entirely consistent with a 
broad understanding of the fairness protections embodied by the 
Strickland right.  To be sure, if a narrow vision of the right to pretrial 
effective assistance emerged as the law of the land—if cases like Premo 
v. Moore210 were understood as defining the contours of the Strickland 
right, then lower courts would be substantially hostile to nullifying a 
reliable verdict based on a failure by counsel to litigate a speedy trial 
claim.211
 
208 Pearson v. State, 619 N.E.2d 590, 591–92 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993); see also Maples v. Stegall, 
427 F.3d 1020 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that defendant was prejudiced when he relied on 
counsel’s advice that a guilty plea would preserve his speedy trial claim); Smith v. Lock-
hart, 923 F.2d 1314, 1319 (8th Cir. 1991) (assessing whether a proceeding was a critical 
stage and determining that it was, based in part on the fact that counsel could have raised 
a due process claim based on the State’s delay in charging him, and reasoning that such a 
“motion obviously had the ability to influence the outcome of the proceedings” as neces-
sary for the critical stage analysis, because “if it were granted there would be no trial”). 
  Stated more directly, the Court’s speedy trial jurisprudence 
209 The author readily concedes that there are currently very few cases addressing the inte-
raction of the constitutional right to counsel and the right to a speedy trial.  This is sub-
stantially explained by the fact that relief under the Sixth Amendment for a speedy trial 
violation is extremely rare.  Cf. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Speedy Criminal Trial:  Rights and 
Remedies, 27 STAN. L. REV. 525, 543 (1975) (“[D]ismissal [with prejudice] as a remedy has 
the sole effect of making judges almost universally prefer the disease.”).  Courts will often 
deny ineffective assistance of counsel claims in this context by summarily recognizing that 
there is no deficient performance because the speedy trial right was not violated.  But just 
as not all prosecutors will comply with Batson, and not all defense lawyers will understand 
the governing Fourth Amendment law, on occasion a lawyer will misapprehend or mis-
calculate the application of the speedy trial right and in the process deprive his client of 
the right to effective assistance, i.e., dismissal with prejudice of the charges.  The prospect 
of such an error warrants attention for its own sake.  More importantly, the speedy trial 
right serves as an important conceptual means of teasing out the contours of pretrial ef-
fective assistance of counsel regardless of the urgency of the issue from a litigation stand-
point. 
210 In Premo, the Court stressed that prejudice could only be shown if counsel’s failures gave 
rise to a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s errors the defendant would have 
had a reasonable chance of succeeding at trial. Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 744 
(2011). Such a standard is, at the very least, hostile to an approach to Strickland that re-
cognizes violations of the right to counsel entirely independent of the strength of one’s 
case at trial.  However, Premo was decided on habeas review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, and 
the merely held that there was no clearly established federal law, as required by statute, as 
to whether a non-trial related conception of prejudice was sufficient for purposes of 
Strickland.    Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733, 745 (2011) (holding that the clearly estab-
lished prejudice standard in the plea context “was established in Hill, which held that a 
defendant who enters a plea agreement must show a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial”). 
211 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 17, at § 11.10(d) (describing Fretwell as a limitation on relief in 
circumstances constituting a windfall).  To be sure, the Court’s decisions in Frye and Lafler 
lend substantial support for the view that the pretrial errors of counsel, even if they do 
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has made it clear that the deprivation of this right need not involve 
prejudice to the defendant’s fair trial, and, as a practical matter, vin-
dicating this right generally requires competent counsel.  Conse-
quently, a trial-focused notion of the right to counsel threatens a 
dead end for the speedy trial right.212
Fortunately, however, the broad conception of the right to coun-
sel enunciated in Lafler and Frye seems entirely consistent with per-
mitting relief when counsel fails to properly raise a viable speedy trial 
claim.  In rejecting the assertion that a fair trial precludes an ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim relating to a missed plea offer, the 
Court explained that “the question is not the fairness or reliability of 
the trial but the fairness and regularity of the processes that preceded 
it.”
 
213  So long as the defendant can show a “reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different,” then relief is permitted.214  In the 
context of speedy trial claims, a defendant simply must show a rea-
sonable probability that the case would have been dismissed with the 
competent advice from counsel.215
 
not undermine the fairness of the trial, can amount to a Sixth Amendment violation.  It 
remains to be seen, however, whether the Court will insist on a showing that the errors of 
counsel contributed to a less favorable outcome, in terms of convictions or sentencing for 
the defendant, a question that will be of significant import for a range of pretrial ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claims unrelated to plea bargaining. 
  Accordingly, the new era of pre-
trial effective assistance law ushered in by Frye and Lafler seems to re-
212 Somewhat related to instances where counsel fails to dismiss a case for speedy trial viola-
tions are instances where counsel fails to take advantage of pressing a case to trial or plea 
when there is a favorable prosecutor on the case.  Imagine, for example, that unnecessary 
delays by defense counsel result in a new, more aggressive prosecutor taking over the 
case.  Such delays could certainly impact the degree of charges or the length of the sen-
tence, but the errors of defense counsel do not undermine the integrity of the trial itself, 
and certainly do not cast doubt on the verdict’s reliability. 
213 Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 10 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012). 
214 Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) (internal citation omitted). 
215 During oral argument in Frye, Justice Breyer suggested that certain instances of ineffective 
assistance of counsel may warrant a heightened standard of prejudice.  Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 16–17, 40, Missouri v. Frye, No. 10-444 slip op. (Oct. 31, 2011).  The speedy 
trial claim is a strong candidate for such a limitation because it does present a realistic 
opportunity for a defense windfall.  If defense counsel realizes that he has a reasonable 
speedy trial claim, he may forego raising it, try his defense at trial, and if the defendant is 
found guilty, notify appellate counsel of the missed speedy trial claim.  Under such cir-
cumstances a speedy trial claim that was only colorable but not certain at the time of trial, 
might lead to definite relief under Strickland.  That is to say, it might be a good strategy to 
forego such a claim if all that is required for post-trial relief is a showing that the claim 
was viable—i.e., a reasonable probability (less than a preponderance of the evidence) that 
the claim would have succeeded at trial.  Determining the proper remedy for ineffective 
assistance that causes a defendant to miss out on a claim that would have required dismis-
sal with prejudice is similarly unresolved. 
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quires relief in circumstances where the errors of counsel resulted in 
the defendant missing an opportunity to have his case dismissed on 
speedy trial grounds. 
C. Challenges to Pretrial Detention 
Understanding the right to counsel in the context of issues relat-
ing to pretrial detention presents a particularly complicated example 
of the potential implications of a broad conception of the right to ef-
fective assistance.  On the one hand, it is generally assumed, and with 
good reason, that pretrial detention impedes the fairness of the trial, 
but on the other hand, the injury to the accuracy or fairness of the 
trial is often difficult to assess in a particular case through ex post liti-
gation following a conviction.216
It seems probable that in the wake of developments regarding 
pretrial ineffective assistance, including the broadening conception 
of these rights through Frye and Lafler, pretrial detention may soon 
serve as a critical flashpoint in the fight over the proper scope of pre-
trial effective assistance.  Representation relating to pretrial detention 
is at the critical intersection between rights that seem unrelated to 
the trial itself, and procedures that may impact, to a varying extent, 
the trial proceedings and the ultimate fairness of the verdict.  As an 
initial matter, most lower courts seem to assume with little discussion 
that a bail hearing or detention proceeding is not a critical stage re-
quiring the appointment of counsel.
  That is to say, unlike the speedy trial 
and jury selection rights, it seems that ineffective assistance in the 
pretrial detention context is assumed to affect the fairness of the trial 
itself, but the application of Strickland to this context is anything but 
well established. 
217  Indeed, a previous study 
found that “only eight states and the District of Columbia guarantee 
that an accused has the assistance of counsel” at this stage.218
 
216 Addressing the problem of ex post inquiries more generally, Donald Dripps has called for 
replacing the post-trial Strickland inquiry with an “ex ante inquiry into whether the de-
fense is institutionally equipped to litigate as effectively as the prosecution.”  Dripps, supra 
note 21, at 243 (“It is all but ludicrous to ask a reviewing court to assess a record made by 
counsel to determine how counsel erred.”). 
  It is es-
217 United States v. Hooker, 418 F. Supp. 476, 479 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (holding a bail reduction 
hearing is not a “critical stage” because pretrial detention does not “impair defense on 
the merits”); id. (explaining that even if bail hearing was a pretrial detention, the illegal 
pretrial detention does not taint the conviction so as to justify post-trial relief) (citing 
Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 523 (1952)). 
218 Douglas L. Colbert, Thirty-Five Years After Gideon:  The Illusory Right to Counsel at Bail Pro-
ceedings, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 8–9 (1998) [hereinafter Colbert, The Illusory Right]; see also 
Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and Legal Case for The 
  
1206 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 14:5 
 
timated that “one out of three incarcerated defendants waits more 
than two weeks following arrest before speaking with court-assigned 
counsel.”219
It has become common for state court judges to preside over pretrial re-
lease hearings of lower-income people without counsel present.  Hear-
ings are perfunctory.  They move swiftly, aided by video jail broadcasts, 
which make it unnecessary even to transport arrestees to the local cour-
troom.  In many jurisdictions, a prosecuting attorney is present and re-
commends bail, thus stacking the odds even more against an accused.  
Under these circumstances, many defendants choose to remain silent, 
while others speak and make inculpatory statements, even as they try to 
minimize their culpability.
  Summarizing practices across the country, one group of 
commentators has provided the following narrative: 
220
For its part, the Supreme Court has concluded that an initial 
probable cause determination is not a critical stage requiring coun-
sel;
 
221 it has seemingly reserved the question of whether an initial ap-
pearance is ever a critical stage,222
 
Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 1719, 1719 (2002) [hereinafter Colbert, Em-
pirical and Legal Case] (“Contrary to common belief, our legal system does not guarantee a 
lawyer to every person whose freedom is at stake.  Instead, the indigent accused usually 
stands alone, without counsel to protect his liberty when first appearing at a bail hearing.  
Most states do not consider the right to counsel to apply until a later stage of a criminal 
proceeding—days, weeks or months after the pretrial release determination.”). 
 and it has not squarely addressed 
the issue of whether pretrial detention litigation might, standing 
alone, trigger the right to appointed counsel.  Recent decisions 
strongly suggest, however, that a majority of the Court does not re-
219 Colbert, The Illusory Right, supra note 218, at 3 n.6 (internal citation omitted).  This prob-
lem should only arise in state cases because Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 44(a) re-
quires the appointment of counsel at the initial appearance.  FED. R. CRIM. P. 44(a) (“A 
defendant who is unable to obtain counsel is entitled to have counsel appointed to 
represent the defendant at every stage of the proceeding from initial appearance through 
appeal, unless the defendant waives this right.”). 
220 Colbert, Empirical and Legal Case, supra note 218, at 1726. 
221 The Court has explained that “[b]ecause of its limited function and its nonadversary cha-
racter, the probable cause determination is not a ‘critical stage’ in the prosecution that 
would require appointed counsel.”  Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 122 (1975).  A recent 
article has deftly summarized the relationship between the Gerstein hearing and the state 
practices regarding pretrial release:   
In Gerstein v. Pugh, the Court ruled that states were not required to provide an 
attorney for indigent defendants at their initial court appearance when judicial 
officers made a probable cause determination and invited states to experiment 
with procedural practices that combined bail hearings with probable cause de-
terminations.  Most local systems eagerly embraced the opportunity.  They con-
cluded that since the United States Supreme Court did not require attorneys at 
the probable cause stage, lawyers were not mandated for pretrial release deter-
minations. 
  Colbert, Empirical and Legal Case, supra note 218, at 1726. 
222 Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 212 (2008). 
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gard the detention hearing as a critical stage.  For example, in Roth-
gery v. Gillespie the Court addressed, to a limited extent, the right to 
counsel’s application at an initial appearance—the stage of the pro-
ceedings when most defendants first appear and seek release on bail.  
The most notable feature of the Court’s decision was the considera-
ble trouble the Court went through in order to distinguish between 
the technical “attachment” of the right to counsel and the actual 
right to appointed counsel.  As to the former, the Court explained 
that the right to counsel attaches at an initial judicial appearance 
where the defendant is arraigned on informal charges and “restric-
tions on the accused’s liberty” are used to facilitate the eventual pros-
ecution.223  But having clarified that the right technically attached at 
the point of an initial appearance when bail might first be obtained, 
the Court explicitly cautioned against “the mistake of merging the at-
tachment question (whether formal judicial proceedings have begun) 
with the distinct ‘critical stage’ question (whether counsel must be 
present . . .).”224  Instead of capitalizing on an opportune moment to 
clarify that the right to appointed counsel applies to one’s first op-
portunity to seek pretrial release, the Court went some distance in 
the opposite direction by clarifying that mere technical attachment 
and the requirement of appointment (and effective assistance) are 
not equivalent.225
Moreover, Justice Alito, writing for himself, Chief Justice Roberts, 
and Justice Scalia, explained that “I join the Court’s [Rothgery] opi-
nion because I do not understand it to hold that a defendant is en-
titled to the assistance of appointed counsel as soon as his Sixth 
 
 
223 Id. at 207–08. 
224 Id. at 211–12. 
225 In a footnote, the Court explained that it did not “here purport to set out the scope of an 
individual’s postattachment right to the presence of counsel.”  Id. at 212 n.15.  However, 
the Court repeatedly discusses with approval the approach of most jurisdictions that is to 
appoint counsel “before, at, or just after the initial appearance.” Id. at 204 (emphasis add-
ed).  If appointment after the initial appearance does not run afoul of the right to coun-
sel, then by extension ineffective assistance at this proceeding does not violate the right to 
counsel.  Cf. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (recognizing that because there 
is no right to counsel for collateral proceedings, there is also no constitutional right to ef-
fective assistance of counsel in these proceedings); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 
(1991) (refusing to extend a right to effective assistance of counsel to proceedings for 
which there is no constitutional right to counsel).  Perhaps, however, the failure to ap-
point counsel (or the ineffective assistance of counsel) at an initial appearance could, at 
the very least, serve as a basis for overcoming a procedural default if certain defenses were 
forfeited or waived at the initial appearance.   See, e.g., Martinez v. Ryan, No. 10-1001, slip 
op. at 5 (U.S. Mar. 20, 2012) (recognizing for the first time that ineffective assistance of 
counsel may serve as may serve as cause to excuse a procedural default even when there is 
no constitutional right to counsel). 
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Amendment right attaches.”226  Justice Alito wrote separately in order 
to emphasize that the right to appointed counsel pretrial is only re-
quired as “necessary to guarantee the defendant effective assistance at 
trial” and to explain that, in his view, the Sixth Amendment’s right to 
counsel for one’s “defence” limits the scope of counsel’s constitu-
tional duties to “defense at trial, not defense in relation to other ob-
jectives that may be important to the accused.”227  Speaking with even 
more clarity as to the scope of the right to counsel, Justice Thomas 
observed that “we have never suggested that the accused’s right to the 
assistance of counsel ‘for his defence’ entails a right to use counsel as 
a sword to contest pretrial detention.”228
Consistent with these opinions, the emerging consensus among 
lower courts, prior to Lafler and Frye, was that the bail hearing was not 
a critical stage requiring competent representation.
 
229  But, such a 
conclusion assumes away the essence of the critical stage analysis, 
which, at bottom, is a practical question about whether the absence 
of counsel at a particular proceeding meaningfully diminishes a de-
fendant’s right to a fair criminal process.230
 
226 Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 213–14 (Alito, J., concurring). 
  That is to say, even under 
a narrow, pre-Frye and pre-Lafler, conception of the right to counsel, 
the critical stage analysis requires careful attention to the practical 
impact of detention hearings on the fairness of one’s trial.  In view of 
227 Id. at 216–17 (citing United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 190 (1984)). 
228 Rothgery, 554 U.S. at 235 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citing Gouveia, 467 U.S. at 190). 
229 There do not appear to be any decisions squarely holding that there is a federal constitu-
tional right to counsel at a bail hearing, but it may be too early to describe the lower 
court decisions to the contrary as forming a consensus.  In truth, there appear to be only 
a handful of courts that have taken up the issue.  See United States v. Hooker, 418 F. 
Supp. 476, 479 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (“A bail reduction hearing is not a ‘critical stage’ of the 
proceedings . . . .”); see also Fenner v. State, 846 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2004) (“Petitioner’s ap-
pearance before a District Court judge for the purpose of setting the appropriate amount 
of bail pursuant to Md. Rule 4-216 is not such a ‘critical’ stage of the proceedings requir-
ing that counsel be provided.” (internal citation omitted)); Colbert, The Illusory Right, su-
pra note 218, at 37–38 (collecting appellate court decisions rejecting the right to counsel 
at bail hearings); ANDREW V. JEZIC ET AL., THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 
MD L. OF CONFESSIONS § 20:1 (2012) (considering whether Rothgery will cause state courts 
to revisit issue of whether bail review is a critical stage).  In Smith v. Lockhart, relying on 
Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 54 (1961), the federal court of appeals held that an 
omnibus hearing at which defendant moved to reduce bail was a “critical stage;” however, 
this hearing also served as the proceeding at which certain defenses had to be raised or 
they would be irretrievably lost.  923 F.2d 1314, 1319–20 (8th Cir. 1991).  In United States 
v. Frappier, a trial judge held that counsel performed deficiently at a bail hearing, but the 
Court does not address whether the bail hearing is actually a critical stage for which one 
is entitled to competent representation.  615 F. Supp. 51, 53 (D. Mass. 1985). 
230 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967); see also Tinmouth, supra note 7, at 1610 
(advocating for a narrow construction of the rights articulated in Strickland by focusing on 
the trial orientation of the right to counsel). 
Apr. 2012] INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 1209 
 
such practical considerations, it is fair to question the jurisprudential 
dogma that there is no right to counsel in proceedings to determine 
whether a defendant will be incarcerated prior to his conviction.231  
There is no question that the right to counsel has attached at the 
time of the bail hearing, and there is substantial support for the view 
that the pretrial detention has an impact on the accused’s ability to 
obtain a fair trial.  Professor Douglas Colbert has written the leading 
article on this question, making the case for regarding bail proceed-
ings as a “critical moment in a criminal case” deserving of the protec-
tions promised by Gideon v. Wainwright.232
Colbert explains that the consequences of bail proceedings are 
among the most critical events in the course of a defendant’s expe-
rience with the criminal justice system.  For example, the “[l]ack of 
representation at the bail stage results in many accused individuals 
spending substantial time in jail on charges that are later dismissed, 
not prosecuted, or reduced.”
 
233  Likewise, “pretrial incarceration has a 
severe and often irreversible impact on employment and family rela-
tionships.”234  In some instances, pretrial detention actually exceeds 
the maximum sentence for the charged offense, and in a case where 
the charges are ultimately dropped, “pretrial detention becomes a jail 
sentence for individuals who were never convicted.”235
 
231 Some lower court decisions seem to suggest that if the defendant could have shown that 
the failure to appoint counsel prejudiced the trial itself, the right to counsel would be vi-
olated.  See, e.g., State v. Williams, 210 S.E.2d 298, 300 (S.C. 1974) (considering the like-
lihood to “prejudice the ensuing trial” as the critical inquiry); Green v. State, 872 S.W.2d 
717, 720–21 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994) (“In essence, we must scrutinize any pre-trial event 
with a view to ascertaining whether presence of counsel is necessary to assure fairness and 
the effective assistance of counsel at trial, which is, after all, ‘the core purpose of the 
counsel guarantee . . . .’” (internal citation omitted)). 
  Such impri-
232 See Colbert, The Illusory Right, supra note 218, at 1–58 (1998) (arguing that the right to 
counsel should apply to bail proceedings); see also Colbert, Empirical and Legal Case, supra 
note 218, at 1720 (presenting a study demonstrating with “empirical data that the bene-
fits of representation are measurable and that representation is crucial to the outcome of 
a pretrial release hearing”); id. at 1747 (describing similar, though more anecdotal con-
clusions from the Manhattan Bail Project of the 1960s).  Notably, Colbert does not direct-
ly address the Strickland problem, which makes sense because he is addressing the neces-
sary antecedent question:  is there a right to counsel simpliciter? 
233 Colbert, The Illusory Right, supra note 218, at 6 (footnote omitted). 
234 Id. (“Faced with the choice of being defended by an unprepared lawyer, many opt to 
plead guilty.”). 
235 Id. at 16 n.66 (discussing a case from Montana where a man was forced to serve sixty days 
of pretrial detention for traffic offenses).  Likewise, in Rothgery v. Gillespie County, the ac-
cused was detained pretrial on charges of being a felon in possession of a firearm; howev-
er, as he was later able to show through the assistance of counsel, he was not a felon and 
thus the detention was entirely unjustified and the charges eventually dismissed.  554 U.S. 
191 (2008).  See Emily Chiang, Indigent Defense Invigorated:  A Uniform Standard for Adjudi-
cating Pre-Conviction Sixth Amendment Claims, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 443, 457–58 
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sonment determinations made without the aid of counsel ought to be 
regarded as inherently suspect under the Sixth Amendment.236  But 
more importantly, for present purposes, Colbert discusses the rela-
tionship between a defendant’s pretrial incarceration and the fairness 
of his trial and sentencing proceedings.  Regarding the trial itself, 
Colbert’s experience as a trial lawyer leads him to make the pragmat-
ic observation that there is a critical difference “between appearing 
alone in an unfamiliar neighborhood looking for a prospective wit-
ness and arriving with a client who can dispel people’s suspicions.”237  
Reasoning from observations like this, Colbert has little difficulty 
supporting the conclusion that representation in the service of secur-
ing one’s pretrial release “impacts the likelihood of a fair outcome.”238
 
(2010) (providing examples of pretrial detention that, without the assistance of counsel, 
become functionally equivalent to indefinite pretrial detention).  Cf. United States v. Sa-
lerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751 (1987) (holding that pretrial detention does not violate due 
process as a general matter, but leaving open the possibility that inadequate procedures 
for determining eligibility for pretrial detention might violate due process). 
  
Moreover, by relying on empirical data, Professor Colbert has elabo-
rated on the relationship between bail proceedings and a fair trial by 
236 Cf. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 37 (1972) (holding that absent a waiver of counsel 
“no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, 
or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his trial” (footnote omitted)). 
237 Colbert, The Illusory Right, supra note 218, at 18.  Lurking not far below the surface of a 
vision of the right to counsel that is divorced from concerns about the adequacy or fair-
ness of the trial is the harmless error doctrine.  Presently, harmless error review is unne-
cessary because of the prejudice requirement built into Strickland.  Cf. Bruce Andrew 
Green, Note, A Functional Analysis of the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 
1053, 1053 (1980) (observing that pre-Strickland many courts adjudicating claims of inef-
fective assistance still required prejudice because of the general requirement of harmless 
error).  However, if the right to counsel is entirely divorced from the trial itself, then per-
haps the harmless error inquiry, which is focused on the fairness and accuracy of the ver-
dict, would reemerge.  See, e.g., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) (ex-
plaining that some procedural or technical errors are “inevitable” and undeserving of 
remedy and that harmless error protects a defendant’s right to a “fair trial, not a perfect 
one”). 
238 Colbert, The Illusory Right, supra note 218, at 18.  Of course, the determination that fair 
trials require representation at the bail stage rests on the assumption that representation 
would, as a general matter, result in less pretrial detention.  This conclusion is confirmed 
by an empirical study of the effect of pretrial representation conducted in Baltimore.  
Colbert, Empirical and Legal Case, supra note 218, at 1720.  Summarizing the findings, a 
group of scholars provided as follows:  For eighteen months at bail hearings, the Balti-
more City Lawyers at Bail Project (“LAB”) defended the liberty of nearly 4000 lower-
income defendants accused of nonviolent offenses.  The study showed that more than 
two and one half times as many represented defendants were released on recognizance 
from pretrial custody as were unrepresented defendants.  Additionally, two and one half 
times as many represented defendants had their bail reduced to an affordable amount.  
Indeed, delaying representation until after the pretrial release determination was the sin-
gle most important reason for lengthy pretrial incarceration of people charged with non-
violent crimes.  Id. 
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explaining that “incarcerated defendants invariably receive more se-
vere sentences than individuals released on recognizance or afforda-
ble bail.”239  Moreover, “when the accused remains in jail, the lawyer’s 
ability to conduct a thorough investigation is impaired,” and the ab-
sence of an early and thorough investigation can substantially preju-
dice an individual’s defense at trial.240
There is, in short, a substantial concern that a person left without 
counsel at the bail hearing is more likely to be held in pretrial deten-
tion, and the effect of such detention is to substantially “derogate 
from the accused’s right to a fair trial.”
 
241  And concerns like these re-
garding the ultimate fairness of the trial have led criminal procedure 
luminaries like Yale Kamisar and Wayne LaFave to urge an under-
standing of the bail hearing as a critical stage.242  LaFave’s criminal 
procedure treatise reasons:  “Because counsel for the defendant can 
make such an impact at the bail hearing, there is much to be said for 
the contention that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies at 
that time.”243
 
239 Colbert, The Illusory Right, supra note 218, at 13. 
  In short, there are compelling arguments in favor of re-
garding the bail hearing as the sort of proceeding that occurs post-
attachment and that is critically important to the ultimate ability of 
the defendant to receive a fair trial facilitated by the effective repre-
sentation of counsel.  And yet, to date, courts have refused the invita-
tion to regard the pretrial bail determination as a stage of the crimi-
nal prosecution requiring the appointment and effective assistance of 
counsel.  This may soon change in light of the promise of a new era 
240 Id. at 18.  Admittedly, a similar argument can be made regarding the attachment rule.  By 
refusing to hold that the right to counsel attaches at the time of arrest, or investigation, a 
defendant’s efforts at trial may be hindered, and yet the Court has unequivocally rejected 
the view that this represents an affront to the right to counsel.  See, e.g., Kirby v. Illinois, 
406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972). 
241 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967) (defining critical stage as “any stage of 
the prosecution, formal or informal, in court or out, where counsel’s absence might de-
rogate from the accused’s right to a fair trial” (footnote omitted)). 
242 See, e.g., Yale Kamisar et al., MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:  CASES, COMMENTS AND 
QUESTIONS 872 n.8 (8th ed. 1994). 
243 LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 17, at § 12.1(c).  Likewise, the reasoning of the Court’s decision 
in Coleman v. Alabama regarding the right to counsel at a preliminary hearing substantial-
ly supports the view that a bail determination ought to be regarded as a critical stage of 
the criminal proceedings, and thus warranting the appointment of counsel.  399 U.S. 1, 
10 (1970).  Moreover, in his concurrence in Coleman, Justice Black notes that there is a 
specific right to counsel guarantee in the Sixth Amendment, but the vague protections of 
“fair trial” are “conceived by judges” and not by the text of the Constitution.  Id. at 12.  In 
his view, judges ought not “add to or detract” from the explicit commands of the Bill of 
Rights, and given that, a bail hearing is an obvious part of the “criminal prosecutions.”  
Id. 
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of constitutional pretrial effective assistance rights as announced in 
Lafler and Frye. 
On the one hand, if it is accepted that one’s representation at the 
bail determination hearing has an impact on the ultimate fairness of 
the trial, then even under the narrowest construction of the right to 
counsel, the right to effective assistance should apply to this proceed-
ing.  Moreover, even accepting the conclusions of several of the 
Court’s current Justices that pretrial release is unrelated to the fair-
ness of the trial itself,244
On the other hand, both Frye and Lafler present circumstances 
where the defendant was able to show that the errors of counsel likely 
resulted in a less favorable ultimate outcome—that is a verdict or sen-
tencing outcome.  Consequently, the bail determination may well 
serve as a bellwether for assessing just how broadly the new era of 
pretrial effective assistance sweeps.  It is clear that outcomes unre-
lated to the fairness of the trial can give rise to Sixth Amendment vi-
olations, but the next question is whether outcomes—such as pretrial 
incarceration—unrelated to both one’s trial and one’s sentence 
could provide a cognizable basis for relief. 
 embracing the new era of effective assistance 
ushered in by Frye and Lafler might, nevertheless, require effective as-
sistance of counsel at this proceeding.  Frye and Lafler make clear that 
in demonstrating a reasonable probability of a different outcome, the 
reliability and fairness of the trial are not the only outcomes that count.  
Insofar as Frye and Lafler reflect a new, more capacious view of the 
range of outcomes that are relevant to an ineffective assistance of 
counsel inquiry, the errors of counsel at a bail determination may 
soon be a constitutionally cognizable basis for relief. 
D. Lack of Jurisdiction and Double Jeopardy 
Courts are understandably reluctant to nullify a guilty verdict, par-
ticularly when the verdict followed a full and fair trial.  And yet, the 
new era of effective assistance tolerates, indeed requires, the nullifica-
tion of procedurally adequate and reliable trial verdicts when certain 
pretrial proceedings were constitutionally inadequate.  In an effort to 
flesh out the implications of a new, broader era for the right to pre-
trial effective assistance, I have discussed three types of claims:  in-
adequate representation resulting in deprivations of one’s Batson 
rights, inadequate representation resulting in deprivations of one’s 
speedy trial rights, and errors of counsel that resulted in pretrial de-
 
244 See, e.g., Rothgery v. Gillespie Cnty., 554 U.S. 191, 213 (2008) (Alito, J., concurring). 
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tention.  None of these claims will result in relief if Strickland is con-
strued as a merits or trial-focused protection,245
Where counsel’s errors relate to the core authority of a court to 
impose criminal sanctions, then reversal of a conviction is warranted, 
and Strickland seems an appropriate vehicle for such reversal.  Claims 
of this nature would include, for example, the failure of counsel to 
challenge a court’s jurisdiction; or the failure of counsel to dismiss a 
charge that attempts to impose criminal punishment for conduct that 
is actually not a crime under the laws of the jurisdiction; or, less clear-
ly, cases where defense counsel fails to dismiss charges for which the 
defendant has already been convicted in prohibition of double jeo-
pardy. 
 but each provides a 
colorable, if uncertain, basis for relief in light of Frye and Lafler.  A 
fourth category of claims for pretrial ineffective assistance, and one 
that seems particularly strong, is that set of claims relating to a defen-
dant’s entitlement to relief when counsel’s errors are of such a fun-
damental and structural nature as to undermine the legitimacy of the 
proceeding itself. 
One could argue that there is little distinction between counsel’s 
errors resulting in the deprivation of a speedy trial claim and the er-
ror of failing to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction or for double jeopardy.  
To be sure, the distinction between these scenarios is not obvious, 
and perhaps not legally relevant.  But, on the other hand, there does 
seem to be something different, something more technical or proce-
dural, about a speedy trial deprivation.  When a defendant is tried a 
second time for the same offense, particularly when he was convicted 
the first time, the proceeding itself seems fundamentally unfair in a 
way that a trial tainted by delay might not.  Likewise, when the defen-
dant is convicted for conduct that is not actually a crime, or when the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction, the conviction itself, though nominally 
reliable insofar as the jury reached a verdict, is intolerable as a matter 
of fundamental fairness.246
 
245 See, e.g., Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 396 (2000) (requiring adequate and reasonable 
pretrial investigation); Manning v. Warden, La. State Penitentiary, 786 F.2d 710, 712 (5th 
Cir. 1986) (requiring a showing that “prejudice” resulted from “the alleged misjoinder”). 
 
246 The view that failures to challenge fundamental defects in the charging authority of the 
prosecution or the jurisdiction of the court are the sort of attorney errors that are cogniz-
able under the Sixth Amendment finds support in Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 
(1970).  In holding that the preliminary hearing was a critical stage the Court stressed, 
among other things, that at a preliminary hearing the “lawyer’s skilled examination and 
cross-examination of witnesses may expose fatal weaknesses in the State’s case . . . .”  Id.  
Notably, however, any weaknesses in the State’s case that might have led “the magistrate 
to refuse to bind the accused over” would generally be of no consequence if the defen-
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However, if the claims amount to an assertion that the defen-
dant’s trial violates core notions of fairness, then one could plausibly 
argue that such claims, rare as they may be, are deserving of relief as 
a matter of due process and the promise of fundamental fairness, not 
as a product of the right to counsel.247  Indeed, the most limited un-
derstandings of the proper application of federal habeas review ac-
knowledge that due process prohibits convictions beyond a court’s 
authority, and thus appears to provide a workable theory of relief.248  
There are, however, at least two hurdles to vindicating such errors of 
counsel through due process rather than through the right to coun-
sel.  First, such an approach might be in tension with the general ca-
non of construction that a specific constitutional provision must 
trump the more general;249 the defect with the conviction is linked 
most directly to the errors of counsel in failing to raise the issue, after 
all.  Second, the doctrine of procedural default would encumber a 
due process claim.250
 
dant was eventually tried and convicted through a fair trial—that is to say, the conviction 
beyond a reasonable doubt at a fair trial renders the inefficacy of counsel at the prelimi-
nary hearing harmless as to the ultimate outcome in the case.  Id.  Thus, Coleman seems to 
implicitly recognize that the critical role of counsel at this stage is to assess whether the 
accusatory instrument is fundamentally deficient based on jurisdictional or similar defects 
in the charges. 
  That is not to say that the procedural default 
247 In urging a limited system of post-conviction review that permitted relief only when the 
prisoner had a colorable claim of innocence, Judge Friendly recognized an exception 
when the trial court lacked jurisdiction.  Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant?  Collater-
al Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 160 (1970). 
248 For example, Justice Thomas explained in Wright v. West that, based on his understanding 
of the common law, a prisoner could not bring a federal habeas corpus challenge 
“[a]bsent an alleged jurisdictional defect.”  505 U.S. 277, 285 (1992); see also Paul M. Ba-
tor, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 
441, 450 (1963) (recognizing that even under a limited vision of federal habeas corpus, 
failures of process and failures of jurisdiction, among other things, warrant federal inter-
vention and oversight). 
249 See, e.g., Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (“Where a particular Amendment 
‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection’ against a particular sort 
of government behavior, ‘that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of ‘substan-
tive due process,’ must be the guide for analyzing these claims.’” (internal citation omit-
ted)); id. at 276 (“[Substantive due process] cannot be used to impose additional re-
quirements upon such of the States’ criminal processes as are already addressed (and left 
without such requirements) by the Bill of Rights.” (internal citation omitted)). 
250 There is a danger of substantial circularity in this analysis.  Procedural defaults can be 
excused by a showing of cause and prejudice, and the cause and prejudice necessary to 
overcome a procedural default is satisfied by ineffective assistance of counsel.  Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (holding that a freestanding claim of ineffective assistance 
must be exhausted in order for the ineffective assistance to serve as cause to excuse the 
default).  BRIAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 9B:74 (2008).  It should be noted 
that demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel as a basis to excuse a procedural de-
fault may provide a role for slightly weaker claims of ineffective assistance because Sixth 
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could not be overcome, but only to suggest that it is a less direct chal-
lenge to the constitutional problem with the trial.251
More importantly, it seems that claims of pretrial effective assis-
tance alleging that counsel failed to challenge the trial court’s fun-
damental authority to conduct a trial provide a sound basis for Strick-
land relief.
 
252  Even prior to Lafler and Frye the lower courts that 
addressed such claims appear to have been unanimous in holding 
that Strickland relief was available.  For example, in a recent case, de-
fense counsel failed to object to an indictment charging a crime that 
was not “legally cognizable,” and on federal habeas review, a judge 
had little difficulty concluding that the defendant’s conviction should 
be reversed based on ineffective assistance of counsel:  “It is axiomatic 
that the elements alleged [in an indictment] must amount to an of-
fense.”253
Similarly, the conclusion that failures by counsel to move for the 
dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction can give rise to ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims is beyond reproach.
  Whether the conviction resulted from a guilty plea or a fair 
trial, this conclusion seems unassailable in light of Frye and Lafler. 
254
 
Amendment claims raised as cause to overcome a default need not themselves satisfy the 
onerous standard of review set out for habeas cases in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). 
  Surely, the rea-
sonable probability that the errors of counsel resulted in a plea or a 
trial that was otherwise jurisdictionally barred, no less than the errors 
of counsel causing the defendant to forego a favorable plea offer, can 
amount to a Sixth Amendment violation.  Likewise, as Professor Jack 
Chin has observed, “collateral relief as ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel” has generally succeeded where counsel failed to dismiss 
251 Presumably a colorable claim that counsel failed to prevent his client from pleading guilty 
based on conduct that was not criminal would be excused by the miscarriage of justice 
exception to the procedural default rules.  Murray, 477 U.S. at 496 (“[I]n an extraordi-
nary case, where a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one 
who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ even in the absence of 
a showing of cause for the procedural default.”). 
252 Cf. United States v. Garcia-Valenzuela, 232 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) (recognizing that 
jurisdictional defects are not waived even by a guilty plea). 
253 Williams v. United States, 684 F. Supp. 2d 807, 823 & n.161 (W.D. Tex. 2010) (footnote 
omitted) (granting relief even though the defendant had pled guilty to the charge be-
cause counsel was deficient in failing to realize that “conspiracy to attempt to possess with 
intent [to] distribute was not a cognizable offense”). 
254 See, e.g., Thomas v. United States, No. 1:08-CV-307, 2010 WL 2349209 (W.D. Mich. June 7, 
2010) (assuming that lack of jurisdiction would provide a basis for establishing a Strickland 
violation); Finley v. Nixon, No. 4:06CV1013-TIA, 2009 WL 3170455 (E.D. Mo. Sept. 25, 
2009) (recognizing that the failure of counsel to challenge the state court’s jurisdiction as 
having been lost under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers was a colorable basis for 
an ineffective assistance of counsel claim); Taylor v. United States, Nos. 3:09CV89-1-W, 
3:05CR297, 2009 WL 2170351 (W.D.N.C. July 20, 2009); Freemont v. United States, No. 
8:99CR183, 2002 WL 202084 (D. Neb. Feb. 8, 2002). 
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charges that were brought in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s 
double jeopardy prohibition.255  Stated differently, although the 
Court has repeatedly emphasized that the “strategic choices” of de-
fense counsel “are virtually unchallengeable” under Strickland,256 a vi-
able “strategy justification is more difficult to hypothesize . . . where 
counsel failed to raise a claim of apparent merit which would have re-
sulted in dismissal of the charges with prejudice” such as for a lack of 
jurisdiction, or double jeopardy.257
In short, to the extent there was any uncertainty as to the status of 
Sixth Amendment claims predicated on the failure of counsel to dis-
miss a charge for something akin to double jeopardy or jurisdictional 
bars, this uncertainty is no more.  In the wake of the Court’s recent 
decisions there is considerably more doctrinal clarity and consistency 
as to the scope of pretrial effective assistance rights. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The right to pretrial effective assistance of counsel is at a critical 
crossroads in its doctrinal life.  Recent cases provide authority for a 
broad construction of the right to effective assistance, such that the 
right is increasingly regarded as valuable for its own sake, and not 
merely as an adjunct to the fair trial right.  To date, however, the con-
sequences of a non-trial-focused right to counsel have gone unexa-
mined.  This Article is a first attempt to expound on the implications 
of a right to pretrial effective assistance that is not oriented solely to-
wards protecting the fairness of the trial and the reliability of the ver-
dict. 
The practical consequences of a broad construction of Strickland 
in the pretrial context may prove to be one of the most significant 
criminal procedure developments in decades.  A number of proce-
dural rights—such as the jury selection rights and the right to a spee-
dy trial, for example—rely for their vindication on the effective assis-
 
255 Gabriel J. Chin, Double Jeopardy Violations as “Plain Error” Under Federal Rule of Criminal Pro-
cedure 52(b), 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1161, 1180 n.111, 1181 (1994) (collecting cases across the 
circuits applying such an analysis); see also Rice v. Marshall, 816 F.2d 1126 (6th Cir. 1987) 
(applying ineffective assistance to a collateral estoppel form of double jeopardy viola-
tion). 
256 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984). 
257 Chin, supra note 255, at 1180 n.111 (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, 
CRIM. PROC. § 11.10(c) at 51 (West Supp. 1991)).  Such strategies are similarly unavaila-
ble when counsel fails to dismiss a case on speedy trial grounds; however, there is, I main-
tain, a colorable difference between claims relating to the core authority of the court to 
hear a case and a speedy trial deprivation, though admittedly the distinction might be 
more theoretical than real. 
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tance of counsel, and yet these rights do not directly implicate the 
fairness of the trial itself.  In the wake of Frye and Lafler, courts must 
be guided by the insight that the purpose of the right to counsel is 
not merely to ensure a fair trial.  No longer is the fairness of the con-
viction or the reliability of the trial dispositive to the Sixth Amend-
ment inquiry.  These developments mark a substantial shift, and a 
new era for the right to effective assistance.258
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
258 See, e.g., Lafler v. Cooper, No. 10-209, slip op. at 4 (U.S. Mar. 21, 2012) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (summarizing the authority that “until today” made it “entirely clear” that the right 
to counsel served the ends of reliable verdicts and fair trials). 
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